PALESTINE A MODERN HISTORY DR. ADULWAHAB AL KAYYALI Chapter One

SETTING FOR A CONFLICT: 1881-1908

At the same time of the Russian pogroms of the early 1880s and the ensuing first Jewish aliya (immigration), Palestine lay wholly within the Ottoman Empire. On the West of the Jordan, it comprised the independent Mutasarrifyya /Sanjak) of Jerusalem (Quds-i- Cherif) to the south and part of the Vilayet of Sham (Syria) to the north. In 1883, the Vilayet of Sham was reorganised and the northern part of Palestine; namely, the Sanjaks of Acre and Nablus (Balqa') were made part of the Yilayet of Beirut.

The Sanjak of Jerusalem was independent and directly linked to the Minister of the Interior in view of its importance to the three major monotheistic religions. It comprised the greater part of the territory of Palestine and more than three quarters of its population.(*l)

The total number of villages was 672 with an estimated population of 457,5922 (*2) (not including the Beduins). The number of educational establishments in Palestine amounted to 956 most of which were primary and elementary schools.

The overwhelming majority of the population was Sunni Muslim. Small numbers of Shi'a and Druzes existed, while around sixteen per cent of the population was Christian, mainly Greek Orthodox, Latin and Creek Catholics. Arthur Ruppin put the number of Jews living in Palestine in 1880 at 25,000. (*3) Both Jews and Christians were free to practice their religions and enjoyed a degree of autonomy through the Millet system. (*4)

The majority of the Muslim population was engaged in agriculture and lived in villages.

Apart from the peasants there was a considerable number of unsettled beduins,

particularly in the vicinity of Beersheba.

The urban population, both Muslim and Christian, was engaged in commerce, the crafts

and modest agricultural industries, and some people held government posts.

Prior to 1880 almost the entire Jewish population of Palestine lived in its Four Holy

Cities': Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safad and Hebron. A sizable proportion of Palestine's Jewry

was supported to a very large extent by the challukah system; the organised collection of

funds in the Diaspora for the support of the pious scholars in Palestine. Never- the less,

piety was not the sole characteristic occupation of Jews in Palestine.

As early as 1851, the British Consul in Jerusalem reported that Jews are the majority of

artisans - which included the glaziers, blacksmiths, watchmakers, tailors, shoemakers,

book-binders. (* 5) In addition they almost monopolised money-lending and the limited

banking business in the country.

Under Turkish rule Palestine was dominated by the leading Arab families who,

principally on the strength of their long established local position,were recruited into the

governing class of the Ottoman Empire.

It was a kind of feudal system consisting of a small number of land-owning families and

a backward peasantry, whereby the 'Ulama' (interpreters of Muslim laws and traditions)

occupied a strong position, for they alone could confer legitimacy on the Ottoman

government acts.

In his excellent study, Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables, Mr Albert Hourani

analysed the relations of mutual dependence between the monarch and the notables; a

concept which had far-reaching implications not merely under the Ottomans but

throughout the period under study.

The political influence of the notables rests on two factors; on the one hand, they must have access to authority, and so be able to advise, to warn and in general to speak for society or some part of it at the

ruler's court; on the other, they must have some social power of their own, whatever its form and origin, which is not dependent on the ruler and gives them a position of accepted and "natural" leadership .(*6)

The Ottoman attempt to reform administration - the Tanzimat (1856) - tended to strengthen the position of the notables rather than limit their role:

... Notables became patrons' of villages, and this was one of the ways in which they came to establish their claims to ownership over them.(*7)

Palestine and the Great Powers

The effects of the decline of the Ottoman Empire were not confined to the growth of the power of the notables. As the Ottoman state became increasingly dependent on foreign protection vis a-vis other foreign powers as well as ambitious vassals, the European powers sought to establish direct links with the various populations of the Empire. Thus, France became the 'protector' of the Catholic communities in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, while the Orthodox Christians came under Russian protection. The British Government's interest in Palestine was aroused by Napoleon's Palestinian Campaign (1799) which posed a threat to the British overland route to India. When Mohammad Ali of Egypt occupied Palestine and Syria and defeated the Ottoman armies, even threatening Constantinople itself, the British Government adopted a course of military intervention and was instrumental in driving the armies of Ibrahim Pasha (son of Mohammad Ali) back to Egypt. It was during that period (1838) that the British Government decided to station a British consular agent in Jerusalem and to open the first European Consulate in March 1839.

Mohammad Ali's advance into Syria opened the 'Syrian Question'. New British policies were formulated as a result. To begin with, Britain sought to emulate the French and the Russian approach in the area. It was during the 1840s and 1850s that the British Government, which had no obvious proteges of its own, established a connection with the Jews in Palestine, the Druzes in Lebanon and the new Protestant churches.

"Behind the protection of trade and religious minorities there lay the major political and strategic interest of the powers. "(*8)

From its start, British presence in Palestine was associated with the promotion of Jewish interests. Albert Hyamson stated, ". . .this question of British protection of Jews became, however, and remained for many years the principal concern of the British consulate in Jerusalem". (*9) In a dispatch to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Viscount Palmerston explained why the Sultan should encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine over and above the material benefits:

.. . the Jewish People if returning under the Sanction and Protection and at the Invitation of the Sultan, would be a check upon any future evil Designs of Mehemet Ali or his successor.(*10)

The Rise of Political Zionism

Modern political Zionism could be said to have been the outcome of the failure of the era of liberalism and equality which had been heralded by the French Revolution, on the one hand, and the growth of nationalist and colonialist ideas and aspirations in nineteenth- century. Europe on the other. For in spite of Rothschild's ascendancy in European finance, that of Disraeli (a converted Jew who gloried in his origins) in British politics and that of Lassalle in the leadership of German socialism, the Haskalah, the "Enlightenment" or Jewish assimilationist movement, was not a complete success. This partial failure could be explained by "the obvious inadequacy of the assimilationist view of anti-Semitism, the fact that bitter Jew-hatred persisted even where its objects were most completely de-Judaized."(*l 1) The reaction to this failure took the form of a call for a national Jewish entity, preferably a national return to Zion.

Thus, Zionism, with its inherent implication of loss of hope in the future total acceptance of the Jew as an individual by the majority society, did not begin to find its way to popular appeal and acceptance until after the Russian pogroms of 1881, which set a mass exodus of millions, in eastern and western Europe, into motion.

There were a number of attempts to create Jewish agricultural communities in Palestine prior to 1881. But philanthropy, not nationalism, was the basis of the London Hebrew Society for the Colonization of the Holy Land, founded by Jews in 1861.(*11) The same year witnessed the establishment of the Alliance Israelite Universelle, an institution for the protection and improvement of the Jews in general and of those in Europe and in the Muslim lands in particular. In 1 870, the Alliance established the Agricultural School Mikveh Israel near Jaffa, obviously aiming at the settlement of Jews in Palestine on a considerable scale.

Following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, and the ensuing pogroms in Russia, the enthusiasm for Haskalah collapsed al its place was taken by a new movement Hibbath (also, Hovevei) Zion (The Love of Zion). Societies were formed in Jewish centres where the question of settling in Palestine as an immediate practical prospect and the study of Hebrew as a living language were discussed.

The first Jewish colonists belonged to an organisation of Russo-Jewish students formed at Kharkov for the colonisation of Palestine known as Bilu. The growth of Jewish

nationalism coincided with the rise of Arab nationalism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

The Arab Awakening

In his well-known book, The Arab Awakening, George Antonius traced the pioneering manifestations of political consciousness in the Yilaye of Syria: It was at a secret gathering of certain members of the Syrian Scientific Society (1868) that the Arab national movement may be said to have uttered its first cry."(*13)

There is no need to go into the question here in great detail. Suffice it to say that after centuries of political inertness the Arab East began to experience a certain political awakening and the beginning of a consciousness of a common Arab identity. On 13 December 1875, the British Consul in Beyrout (Beirut) reported: For some years past there has existed amongst certain classes, especially the Mohametans, of the population of Syria tendency to desire annexation to Egypt which has gradually grown in intensity.(*14)

On 28 June 1880, the British Consul-General in Beirut reported the appearance of "revolutionary placards in Beirut. "(* 15) In subsequent telegrams the British Consul reported the main points of the first recorded statement of an Arab political programme (1880):

(1) the grant of independence to Syria in union with the Lebanon.

(2) the recognition of Arabic as an official language in the country.

(3) the removal of censorship and other restrictions on the freedom of expression and the diffusion of knowledge. (* 16)

From the scanty evidence available we learn that Palestine was not insulated from the new political trends in the Levant. Following Arabi's stand against the British in Egypt, the British Consul reported riots and excitement in Jerusalem and Jaffa: It is quite certain that the native Moslems profoundly sympathised with Arabi, both as a Mohammadan fighting against unbelievers and more especially, as the champion of the Arab Mussulman race, upon whose success posed possibilities affecting the future of their race other than merely repelling the invasion of Egypt. "(817)

Two years later, the British Consul reported the Palestinians' reactions to the revolt of the Mahdi in the Sudan in the following manner: Whilst the general feeling of the Moslems as regards the religious aspect of the (Mahdi) Movement is such as I have stated there is an undercurrent of sympathy carefully suppressed on their part in favour of the Mahdi as an Arab struggling for his race against Ottoman domination and misrule.(*18)

This nascent nationalist feeling did not express itself in any particular form of anti- Jewishness. While civil strife and tension between the various religious sects were not infrequent, in his first report on the state of the Jews in Palestine (1839) Vice-Consul Yolu informed Viscount Palmerston that the Jews were being permitted to live in the Mussulman Quarter' and ...were a Jew here to fly for safety, he would ask it sooner in Mussulman's house than in that of a Christian.(*19)

In 1853 the British Ambassador in Constantinople reported that a Jew was admitted to the meetings of the Mejlis (Council) of Jerusalem four years earlier.(*20)

The Shape of Things to Come

However, with the advent of Jewish agricultural settlements inspired by Zionist ideas of a national return to Zion, a definite change in the character of the Jew in Palestine occurred. The new immigrants were no longer old pious Jews coming to Palestine to pray and die, but rather determined young Jews coming to live and establish a Jewish nation of their own. The new Jewish settlers found reliable backing and support in Baron Edmond de Rothschild; and from 1896, Baron de Hirsch's Jewish Colonisation Association began to interest itself in Jewish settlement in Palestine.

The net increase in the Jewish population of Palestine between 1880 and 1910 amounted to 55,000. Almost from the beginning the new settlers caused friction and offended the local population, 'because they were ignorant of Arabic and of Arab ways. For example, the Jell unfamiliar with the custom of Masha regarded the incursions of Arab shepherds with their flocks as trespass and expelled them forcibly etc.(*21)

Some of the wealthy landowners were willing to sell land to the new immigrants at profitable prices. However,"the eviction of the peasants from the land caused serious clashes. "(*22) It is interesting to note that some instances lands were sold by the government to the Jews because the peasants were unable to pay their taxes, and on other occasions the peasants fell victims to usurers who in turn sold the lands to the Jewish immigrants. "(*23) It was not surprising, under those circumstances, that the evicted Arab peasants should, as early as 1886, attack the new established Jewish colonies in protest against having their villages taken away from them.(*24) The apprehensions of the peasants were shared by the small predominantly Christian, class of tradesmen and professionals who feared the threat of economic competition which was to follow.

The friction between the peasants and the Jewish colonists, among other things, might have prodded the authorities towards imposing restrictions on Jewish immigration. In March 1887, the British Consul in Jerusalem reported that,"for some time past the local Turkish authorities... have been inhibiting foreign Jews from coming to reside in Jerusalem, or in Palestine generally."(*25) In 1890, the Arab notables of Jerusalem protested to Constantinople against Rashad Pasha, the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem, for his leanings towards the Jews. The protest was followed, on 24 June 1891, by a petition "organised by the Muslim notables in Jerusalem to the Grand Vezir that Russian Jews should be prohibited from entering Palestine and from acquiring land there". (*26) We shall see later that this first protest spelled out the two cardinal demands which all ensuing protests against Jewish immigration and colonisation reiterated; namely, the prohibition of Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine.

The conflict over evicting Arab peasants from newly bought Arab lands continued during the last decade of the nineteenth century. Mandel described the pattern of reactions among the rural population of Palestine towards the new colonies as being one of " initial resentment, suppressed or open hostility, giving way in time to resignation and outward

reconciliation:"(*27) In 1895, after talks with Palestinian Arab merchants, Najib al-Hajj, the editor of Abu-al-Hol of Cairo accused the Jewish colonists of expropriating the Arabs' means of livelihood.

Both , Rashad Pasha, the Ottoman Mutasarrif, and the educated Palestinians were quick to perceive that the Zionists sought to establish a Jewish State in Palestine. Yusuf al- Khalidi " viewed the Zionist movement with grave concern: he recognised the existence of a Jewish problem in Europe. ..but he also foresaw that a Jewish state could not be established in Palestine without hostilities and bloodshed because of Arab opposition". (*28)

The Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Taher al-Husseini, fought Jewish immigration and agricultural settlement, and in 1897, he presided over a commission which scrutinised applications for transfer of land in the Mutasarrifiyya and so effectively stopped all purchases by Jews for the next few years. "(*29) In 1900 there was a campaign of protest by means of signed petitions against Jewish purchases of land.(*30)

Fears and Apprehensions

In the same year, A Antebi, of the Jewish Colonial Association (a non Zionist institution)

reported:

The Zionists had made the Muslim population ill-disposed to all progress accomplished

by the Jews. A year and a half later, illiterate Muslim peasants asked him, 'Is it time that

the Jews wish to retake this country?' and in early 1902 the ill-will had spread to the

Administrative Council, the law courts and government officials many of whom

especially at lower levels were drawn from the population.(*31)

Religious sentiments were an additional ground of resentment: Muslim sentiments in Jerusalem were reflected in the following statement made in 1903 by a young (and, it is reported not very fanatical) Arab: "We shall pour everything to the last drop of our blood rather than see our Haram Sharif fall into the hands of non Muslims". (*32)

It is also worth noting that local government officials, Christians and educated Muslims, were interested in reading Zionist literature, and some of them even read Ha-Po 'el Ha-Za 'ir. This explains the state of alarm among the Arab population of Palestine, following the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905, which resolved that Zionist efforts must be directed entirely towards Palestine.

The Palestinians were not entirely alone in conceiving the implications of Jewish immigration and agricultural settlement in Palestine. Rashid Rida, one of the most prominent Islamic reformists and of the influential AI-Manar, recognised that the Jews were seeking national sovereignty in Palestine. (*33) In his book La reveil de la Nation Arabe (Paris, 1905), Najib Azoury warned that Zionists and Arab nationalist aspirations would come into conflict. Because Azouri called for Arab independence, copies of his manifesto had to be smuggled into Palestine as a result of which several Arab notables in Jaffa, Gaza and Ramla were imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities. (*34)

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, an important event took place that was destined to have a most dramatic impact on the fate of Palestine. Organised Zionism was born at the First Zionist Congress, 1897, where the formulation of the Zionist Programme, and the establishment of the Zionist Organisation were achieved. The Zionist Programme , alias the " Basle Programme, "(*35) declared that " the aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by law', to be achieved by systematically promoting the settlement in Palestine of Jewish agriculturalists, artisans and craftsmen, in addition to strengthening the Jewish national consciousness through Zionist Federation all over the world. After creating the Zionist Organisation, founder, Theodor Herzl,(*36)

proceeded to create the instruments of systematic colonisation. Herzl had his misgivings about the haphazard colonisation of Palestine supported by wealthy Jews as a mixed philanthropic nationalistic venture. For him, it did not prove to be the right way for the fulfillment of Zionist aims. The chosen instruments for this colonisation scheme were The Jewish Colonisation Trust (1898), The Colonisation Commission (1898), The Jewish National Fund (1901) and The Palestine Land Development Company (1908).(*37)

With the arrival in Palestine of the second aliya (1904-1907), a more determined, better organised and ideologically committed attitude prevailed. The attitudes between the first and second aliya colonists differed in a number of aspects, of which the most important constituted their attitude towards the Arab population of Palestine. An outstanding leader of the second aliya, David Green (Ben-Gurion),(*38) spoke about the state of Jewish affairs at the time of his arrival in 1906:

Among the early disappointments was the spectacle of Jews of the first aliya, now living as effendis, drawing their income from groves and fields worked by hired workmen or from occupation of the kind imposed on our people by their exile. It was clear to me that we could never achieve national rehabilitation that way.(*39)

According to Ben-Gurion the aims and achievements of the second aliya were radically different from those of the first aliya: "Pioneer aliya gave birth to a Jewish community radically unlike all others, independent in economy, culture and speech, able to defend itself. "(*40)

Here we find the prototype, as it were, of the embryo of the contemplated Zionist state: exclusively Jewish, motivated by Zionist ideals and almost completely insulated. The key Zionist concept in this context was Kibush Avodah (Conquest of Labour). In Ben-Gurion Looks Back, the Zionist veteran explained this concept, and the fight it against Jewish landowners who preferred Arab labourers to inexperienced Jewish hands, and the dismissal of Circassian guards with the resulting emergence of the organisation of watchmen called the Hashomer, the forerunner of the Haganah.(*41)

This rigid and doctrinaire attitude vis-a-vis the "naives" left no room for conciliation. The Arab tenant farmers were not merely dispossessed, they were prevented from being employed as hired hands, The reaction was one of widespread resentment, and by 1907, "anti-Jewish feeling had intensified among the most influential segments of the

Arab population and was latent among fellaheen who had contact with the Jewish Settlers. (*42)

Notes

1. Vital Cuinet, Syrie. Liban et Palestine, Geographie Administrative, Stistique Descriprive et Raisonnee. Paris, 1896, p.520.

2. Ibid., pp.93, 180 and 520.

3. Arthur Ruppin, The Jewish Fate and Future, London, 1940, p. 54.

4. A practice which granted non-Muslim subjects a limited autonomy under the chief ecclesiastical leaders of the various religious sects.

5. James Finn to Viscount Palmerston, 7 November 1851, FO 78/874, nr 20.

6. Albert Hourani, Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables, unpulished manuscript, pp. 6-7. (Subsequently published in Beginnings of Modernisztion in the Middle East. The Nineteenth Century, edited by William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, Chicago, 1968, pp.4168.)

7. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

8. Ibid., p.35.

9. Albert Hyamson, The British Consulate in Jerusalem in Relation to the Jews of Palestine, 1838-1914, London, 1939-1941, part I, p.xxxiv.

10. Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby, 1 1 August 1840, FO 71 no. 134.

11. Arthur Hertzberg (ed.), The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Rader, New York, 1959,p.29.

12. Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism: 1600-1918, 2 vols., London, 19 p. 256.

13. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, Beirut, n.d., first published 1938, p. 54. Also see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1978-1939, London, 1962; Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, Beirut, 1958; and William Yale, The Near East, Ann Arbor, 1958.

14. 13 December 1875,FO 226/183.

15. 28 June 1880, FO 195/1306.

16. Antonius, op.cit., pp.834.

17. 1882, FO 226/204, No.37.

18. 14 March 1884, FO 195/1477.

19. 25 May 1839, FO 78/368, No.13.

20. 11 August 1853, FO 78/962, No.26.

21.Mandel Neville, Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914, unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, St Antony's College, Oxford, 1965, p. 32.

22. Ibid., p.37.

23. Ibid., p.36.

24. Ibid., p.40.

25. 5 March 1887.FO 195/1581,No.9.

26. Mandel, op.cit., p.44. 27. Ibid., p.56.

28. Ibid., p.57.

29. Ibid., p. 155.

30. Ibid., pp. 102-3.

31. Quoted, ibid., p. 132.

32. Ibid., p. 133.

33.AI-Manar, Vol.IV, 1902, pp.801-9.

34. Mandel, op.cit., pp.1456.

35. It is commonly referred to as The Basle Programme because the First Zionist Congress met at Basle, Switzerland.

36. For Herzl's ideas and activities see Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Thcodor Herzl, 5 vols., edited by Raphael Patai, translated by Harry Zohn, New York, 1960.

37. For further details of the Zionist organisational structure see Sokolow, op.cit., I, pp. 263-131 passim.

38. Ben Gurion soon became the pillar of the Jewish Community in Palestine and was the most outstanding Zionist leader from the thirties onwards. In 1948 he was declared the first Prime Minister of Israel.

39. David Ben Gurion, Israel: Years of Challenge, London, 1964, p. 7.

40. Ibid., p.42.

41. Moshe Pearlman (ed. and trans.), Ben Gurion Looks Back. London, 1965, pp. 25-7.

42. Mandel, op.cit., p. 148.

Chapter 2

CRYSTALLIZATION 1908-1914

By 1908 resentment against the incoming Jews backed by foreign protection, endowed with the privileges and advantages of the Capitulations, began to assume new dimensions. Following the Ottoman Revolution of 1908, a Palestinian newspaper, AI- Asma'i, seized the occasion of parliamentary election, and drew a comparison between conditions of the Palestinian Arab peasant and his Jewish counterpart, then went on to point out the harm done by Jewish immigration:

They harm and do evil to the indigenous population, by relying on the special rights enjoyed by foreign powers in Turkey and on the corruption and treachery of the local administration. In addition they are free from most of the taxes and heavy impositions on Ottoman subjects; they compete with the native population with their labour, and create their own means of sustenance and the (native) population cannot stand up to their competition. (*-l)

As a remedy the paper proposed that its readers buy local rather than foreign products and called upon wealthy Arabs to support development of native commerce and industry. The Palestinian peasants resented the Jewish colonists and were hostile from the moment of the settler's arrival in some cases. (*-2)

In December, 1908, villagers from Kafr Kama tried to seize some land belonging to J.C.A. in the CAZA of Tiberias.(*-3)

The Land-sellers

Hand in hand with this resentment went the indignation at feudal landowners profiting from land sales to Jews at high prices:

In November, 1908, it was reported that the peasants in the region of Haifa and Tiberias were adopting an aggressive attitude towards Arab landowners with large estates (Mustafa Pasha, Fu'ad Sa'd and the Sursuq family) and also towards Jewish colonies. (*-4)

This raises the issue as to the exact identity of the landowners who profited at the expense

of obvious harm done to Arab tenants with utter disregard for the pressure of public

opinion against the sale of land to the colonists.

A hitherto unpublished manuscript written by a prominent member of the Khalidi family

(*-5) and completed in 1911, sheds light on the general state of political information in

Palestine at that time, as well as providing valuable information on Jewish colonies.

This manuscript, entitled al-Mas'ala al-Sahyuniyya (The Zionist Question), left its

imprint on a number of individuals who later played key roles in the national movement

in Palestine, like Haj Amin al-Husseini.(*-6)

The author started by defining Zionism, its origins, history and aims; the establishment of

a Jewish State in Palestine being the most important of all aims. With some detail and

considerable knowledge, the author described Herzl's efforts, the Zionist Congresses and the institutions designed to serve and achieve Zionist aims. Furthermore, he drew a subtle and definite distinction between Zionist and non Zionist Jews. After a short account of Jewish history, the author dealt in a careful and informative fashion with the activities of Jewish immigrants and their colonies. The author provided his readers with a list of all the Jewish colonies, the area of each colony, its original name in Arabic, and from whom the land was bought.

In the overwhelming majority of cases the lands were sold by one or the other of the following three categories:

(1) Absentee landlords, mostly Lebanese families - Sursuq, Tayyan, Twainy, Mudawar and others.

(2) The Ottoman Government, apparently through auctions owing to the inability of the Arab peasants to pay their taxes.

(3) The Palestinian landlords, mostly Christian families, - Kassar, Rock, Khoury, Hanna and others. (*-7) Some lands were sold by Muslim Notables, but the author did not always disclose their names.

In two cases, he wrote, "one of the effendis of Safad or Ramleh".

Only three villages were reported to have been sold by the peasants and represented less than 7% of the total land bought by the Jews.

In all, the Jews at that time owned 28 villages and a total area of 279,491 dunum; a fraction of Palestine's cultivable area. In a letter published in al-Ahram on 4 August 1909, a Palestinian studying at al-Azhar accused the Jews of employing devious means; namely, bribing the Ottoman governors of the ancient regime as a means of obtaining land in Palestine. There were other attempts by Palestinians to make capital out of associating the previous regime with concessions made to the Zionists, including laxity in the application of laws regarding Jewish immigration and land acquisition by them. Furthermore, members of the (Ottoman) ruling Committee for Union and Progress, with branches in Palestine, endeavoured to exercise inter-party pressure to draw the attention of the ruling junta to "the danger which menaces the country and the peasants from Jewish immigration". (*-8)

The Forms and Forums of Arab Opposition to Zionism

By the end of 1909 sustained vocal opposition to Zionist immigration had become the order of the day. The mounting Palestinian opposition was promoted and adequately expressed by the only Arabic newspapers in Palestine al-Asmai' and al-Karmal. The editor of the latter paper played a leading role in publicizing the Zionist threat to Palestine and the Palestinians. Najib al-Khuri Nassar, a native of Tiberias, had worked with the Jewish Colonisation Association as an agent and thus was able to speak with authority on the aims and the means of Jewish colonisation in Palestine. He founded al- Karmal (1909) with the express purpose of writing against the Yishuv in Palestine as that the Arabs would not continue to sell land to the Jews.(*-9)

Complaints from Jews about articles which had appeared in al-Karmal resulted in its temporary suspension in the early summer and again in the winter of 1909. The notables found in the new Ottoman Parliament an opportunity to articulate Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism and Jewish immigration. At the beginning of June

1909, Hafez Bey al Sa'id, the deputy from Jaffa, submitted a question to the Chamber, asking what Zionism implied and if the national movement of the Jews was compatible with the interests of the Empire. He also demanded that the port of Jaffa be closed to Jewish immigrants. (*-10) Though the forum was modern, the old role of the notable as an intermediary between the ruler and the ruled persisted.

Towards the end of the year there was a note of exasperation in the air. In October, al-Ahram sent a correspondent to Palestine to report on the local situation. The Palestinians are concerned about the Zionist Movement; constant immigration creates fear and anxiety for the country is now almost in the hands of foreigners. "(*-l 1) Furthermore, the reporter recorded that the Palestinians accused the Zionist Movement in Palestine of seeking to establish an independent kingdom, and asserted that some rich Jews had undertaken to pay sums of money to the Ottoman Government so that the Ottoman Jews in Palestine would be spared military service and could devote all their efforts towards colonisation, at a time when Muslims and Christians had no alternative but to undergo the hated military service.

Amidst resentment and suspicion of Governmental collusion, a development took place in the same year; opposition to Zionism and Jewish settlement began to assume an organisational form. In October 1909, Albert Antebi observed that a group was being formed among the local population to prevent sales of land to Jews."(*-12)

In addition to the familiar platforms of protest - newspaper articles, and delegations - to the various levels of authority, the year 1910 witnessed the emergence of a call for an Arab boycott of Jewish and businesses in retaliation for Zionist boycott of Arab labour and shops.

In May 1910, the Arab press attacked the Sursuq family for their intention to sell the

villages of Fulah and Afulah to the Jews. The inhabitants of Nazareth and' Haifa

dispatched two telegrams to the Central Government protesting against Jewish land

purchases and accusing the Zionists of seeking to deprive the local population of its

land.(*-13)

Al-Karmal warned against mortgaging any land with the Anglo-Palestine Company

because of its Zionist identity. In the middle of May,a group of Arab deputies demanded

an assurance from Tala't Bey that Jews would not be permitted to take possession of the

local population's lands and that mass Jewish immigration would not be tolerated. (*-14)

Protestations to the Ottoman authorities were not in vain. When an official of the British

Embassy in Constantinople spoke to Tala't Bey about the renewed land restrictions, he

was told that they were that they were "the outcome of complaints of the local inhabitants

who feared a foreign Jewish invasion". (*-15)

By the summer of 1910, several influential Arabic newspapers in Damascus (al-

Muqtabas) and in Beirut (al-Mufid, al-Haqiqa, and al-Ra'i al Am) were won over to the

campaign against the sale of Arab lands to settlers and became part of the anti-Zionist

press campaign.

In some cases Najib Nassar's efforts were instrumental in drawing the attention of the

editors to the Zionist danger.(*-16)

During debates in Parliament the Palestinian deputies urged the government to to take action against Jewish immigration and land and were energetically promoting and propagating the notion the incompatibility between Ottoman interests and Zionist aims in Palestine. "During March and April Dr. Jacobson reported from Constantinople that the Arab deputies, especially Ruhi Bey al-Khalidi, were conducting a campaign for new legislation against Jewish immigration into Palestine. "(*- 17)

Sa'id al-Husseini, deputy of Jerusalem, well-versed in Zionist ideas and activities owing to his proficiency in Hebrew, was another active anti-Zionist. Albert Antebi reported that, since accounts of speeches by Ruhi Khalidi and Shukri al-Assali had spread among the peasants, anti Jewish feeling had widened. '(*-18) A telegram signed by one hundred an fifty Arabs was dispatched from Jaffa to the President of the Chamber, to the Grand Vazir and to various newspapers in protest against the continual purchase of land by Jews and urged Parliament to take steps against Jewish immigration and land purchase. (*-19)

On 24 May 1911, ha-Herut carried the text of a leaflet which proclaimed the emergence of organised Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism. The leaflet was signed al-Hizb al- Watani al-Uthmani (The Ottoman National Party). The Party addressed itself to the Arabs of Palestine in the following terms:

Zionism is the danger which encompasses our homeland; [Zionism is the awful wave which beats [our] shores; it is the source of the deceitful acts which we experience like a downpour and which are to be feared more than going alone at the dead of night. Not only this; it is also an omen of our future exile from our homeland and of (our) departure from our homes and property.

Suleiman al-Taji al-Farouqi, a founder of the Ottoman Nations Party, sought to mobilise public opinion in the neighbouring Arab districts of the Ottoman Empire against what he and his associate regarded as Zionist invasion. On 19 August 1911, this able writer and poet wrote an important long editorial in al-Mufid, a leading Beirut newspaper run by Abdul Ghani al- Arisi, a prominent political figure Al-Farouqi stated that Palestine had virtually fallen within the sphere of Zionist influence, and that Zionism in Palestine constituted a government within a government with its own laws and courts, its own flag, its own school system etc. Jewish immigrants, he contended, were equipped with education and money, and the Palestinians were threatened with poverty and eviction. These conditions prodded a group of young men to establish; A National (Patriotic) party to promote everything beneficent to the nation, and to direct all efforts towards lawful opposition to the Zionist Movement and fighting it with the weapon of justice, in addition calling the attention of the Ummah (Nation) to the grave consequences and reminding the government of its duties: First, stoppage of immigration by applying the Red Passport. (*- 20).

Second, prohibition of sales of land. Third, carrying out a census among the Jews and giving the Ottomans among them clear identity cards. Fourth, imposition of governmental control and official curriculum over their schools. Fifth, prohibition of their special meetings unless they obtain special permission from the authorities in accordance with the laws governing such meetings. Sixth, carrying out land surveys in the colonies,

and imposing the various taxes, tithes and Wercos, and reasserting the lost rights of the Treasury.

The growth of Arab opposition to Zionism was reported by the Palestine correspondent of Ha'olam, the central Zionist organ, in the following terms:

The greater force in Palestine is the Arabs... we forgot altogether that there are Arabs in Palestine, and discovered them only in recent years... we paid no attention to them; we never even tried to find friends among them. The greatest enemies of Jewish efforts are the Christian intellectuals among the Arabs. (*-21)

The last sentence was an acknowledgement of the efforts of Najib Nassar, editor of al- karmal, whose unyielding perseverance in combating Zionism was effective in stirring public opinion inside and outside Palestine against Zionist immigration and settlement. On 7 June 1911, Nassar published in al-Karmal an open letter addressed to all newspaper editors who shared his views, suggesting that they unite in a common front against the Zionists. Within a few days his suggestion found support from Taha al-Mudawwar of Beirut's al-Ra i al- Am who proposed a common stand among the newspapers against Zionist settlement, in an endeavour to bring about appropriate government action to prevent it. On reviewing the Arabic newspapers of the second half of 191 1, the reader would readily notice the expanded circle of anti-Zionist articles.

During the same year Najib Nassar also published a book entitled, al-Sahyuniyya: Tarikhuha, Gharaduha, Ahammiyyatuha (Zionism: Its History, Aims, and Importance), where he told his readers that the Zionist Movement rested on a racial base, and its aims were both national and political. He laid stress on its independent institutions, its paramilitary gymnastic societies, its flag and its emblem. After stating that Zionism aimed at gaining "Mastery over our country and the sources of our livelihood', he pointed out that 'unwavering leadership and bold, ambitious plans were required... We the Arabs need to rely upon ourselves and to stop expecting everything from the Government'. The Palestinians were discovering that the Government was not very keen on protecting them from the Zionist danger. Calls for organisation found receptive ears. After the second debate on Zionism in Parliament, Nassar drew the attention of the readers of al- Karmal to the lax manner in which entry restrictions and regulations were enforced by the Ottoman authorities in Haifa. He succeeded in setting up a citizen's watch committee, which was successful in gaining permission from the Mutasarrif of Acre to supervise the disembarkation of Jews from all ships docking at Haifa in order to see that the entry restrictions were fully implemented. Nassar's efforts left an imprint on a number of Arab journalists, like Tsa al-'lsa of Falastin and Izzat Darwaza, the writer- politician who played a role in the Arab national movement in Palestine as we shall see later on. Opposition to Zionism found some expression in literary works like al-Sahir wa al- Yahudi (The Wizard and the Jew) by Is'af Nashashibi, March 1909, and Fatat Sahyun (The Young Girl of Zion) by Maruf al- Arna'ut, November 1911.

By the beginning of 1912 the Zionists were already speaking of "the spirit of enmity which has begun to gain a foothold among the masses in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem"(*-22).

The anti-Zionist campaign in the Arabic press continued unabated. Al-Munadi, a newspaper which began to appear in Jerusalem in the spring of 1912, was candidly anti Zionist from its first issue. An article by Muhammad Salah al-Samadi al-Husseini of Jerusalem in al-Rai al Am declared that the dangers of Zionism and Jewish immigration were ten-fold. Zionist-inspired Jewish immigration would lead to: Jewish settlement in places of the greatest commercial and strategic importance; the sale of the local population's houses and land; the loss of the most valuable land; the return of the Jew's money to their own pockets through places of entertainment and the like which they would open for the Arabs; the subjugation of the local population to the Jews; the usurpation of all educational affairs by Zionist schools; the theft of industry and trade by Zionist banks and; institutions; the defeat of the most powerful Arab leaders; and finally, the economic domination of Palestine through which political power would be generated. '(*-23) Echoing the tone of this article al-Muqtabas alleged in its issue of 25 December 1912, that Zionism sought to destroy the totality of our economics and polities'.

Falastin, which was on its way to becoming the foremost anti-Zionist paper, informed its

readers, in its issue of 28 August 1912, that active immigrants own thirty colonies or

villages, that immigration is proceeding at a terrific language of the pace and that Hebrew

will become the official language of the country someday.

The Zionists have advanced schools and numerous important "newspapers and have

powerful societies backing them. The article concluded by exhorting the Arabs of

Palestine to wake up to prevent a catastrophe before it is too late.

Three days later the Same paper called for the unity of all Palestinians to combat the

Zionist danger.(*-24)

Among the Ottoman provinces Palestine alone was free of the prevailing strife and tension between Muslim and Christian Arab communities due to the Balkan War. The relations between the two communities in Palestine were remarkably good owing to solidarity against the common Zionist danger.

On 17 November 1912, Falastin published an article accusing the Mutassarrif of complicity in Selling lands to the Jews in the face of Arab opposition and widespread protest. By the end of 1912 Falastin was so outspoken against Zionism that ha-Herut's correspondent in Jaffa called for its boycott.

The pace was set for 1913 by al-Karmal in an editorial of 3 January. That editorial dealt

with the general political situation as well as giving an evaluation of the outcome of the

paper's four- year campaign against Zionism, It referred to the efforts of some Arab

deputies like Shukri al-Assaly and Ruhi Khalidi in particular to combat Zionism in

debates in the Ottoman Parliament.

Then it proceeded to attack other leaders who, while pretending to safeguard the national

interests, were in fact indulging in brokerage and sales of land to the Zionists.

The article concluded by stating that "a good number of enlightened people, journalists

and (local) government officials, recognised the menacing Zionist danger and were

fighting this danger with us".

Throughout the summer of 1913 Syria witnessed a general campaign of protests against

the sale of state lands in Beisan to the Jews.

In June Falastin published two telegrams from the leaders of the villages and tribes of

Beisan addressed to the Sultan and the Vali of Beirut.

In these telegrams the inhabitants explained that the lands in question were usurped from

them and registered in the name of the previous Sultan and that the state was now

contemplating selling it to foreigners. The telegram reminded the Sultan that it was the

duty of the ruling authorities to safeguard the interests of their subjects whom they taxed

and conscripted. "We prefer to die defending our nation and our possessions rather than

emigrate to unknown destinations and perish from starvation".(*-25)

On 29 June, Falastin hinted that what Palestine, the "beloved nation", needed was the bliss of independence but that "We dare not spell it out". The same issue carried an article contributed to a reader in which he emphasised that words cannot stand in the face of finance, science, zeal and national solidarity of the Zionists. Only action can stand in the face of action. The writer suggested the establishment of a national Palestinian land company financed by group of wealthy Palestinians to buy lands that were not under cultivation and to exert pressure on the government to confine cultivate land sales to peasants. He concluded by calling for unity and co-operation to defend the country.

In these articles, published in the early part of the second decade, two things merit remark. The first is the implicit and permeating feeling of admiration for the advanced technological and organisational methods employed by the Zionists. The second is the underlying an sometimes explicit realisation that only through acquiring knowledge, skill and organisation could Arab opposition to Zionism be effective.

The First Arab Congress

The political stirrings and cross-currents of political ideas and aspirations culminated in the convening of the First Arab Congress in Paris during June 1913, which included an impressive number of prominent political personalities from the Levant. It was an attempt at articulating a political programme demanding partnership and equality between the Arabs and the Turks within the Ottoman Empire. Delegates demanded recognition of the Arabs as I nation entitled to autonomy within a decentralised Ottoman state ant to representation on all legislative and executive levels. They also demanded cultural independence and promotion of the Arabic language to the status of an official language.

Among the participants listed in the book published on the proceedings of the Congress, there were a number of Palestinian notables and students. The more striking aspect of the Palestinian presence in the Congress were the telegrams sent from Palestine to the Congress. These telegrams revealed the existence of two literary groups in Jaffa al-Multa' am al-Adabi(*26)

(The Literary Meeting Place) and al Jam'iyyri al-Khairiyya al-lslamiyya (The Islamic Benevolent Society). Telegrams were also sent by the inhabitants of Nablus and Haifa who pledged their support and called for reform and decentralisation. Other telegrams from the headmen and local notables of Beisan and Jenin urged the Congress to declare its opposition to the sale of lands in their district which they claimed were usurped from

them by the Ottoman ANCIEN REGIME. The signatories considered the delegates as 'representative of the Arab Nation', and the loss of the Beisan lands as a threat to the whole Arab Nation. (*27)

It was extraordinary that the First Arab Congress did not discuss fully the Zionist danger in Palestine and that no resolutions were passed in relation to this important and preoccupying issue. The fact was that the incipient Arab national movement was contemplating ways and means to attain political independence for the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In a paper published in Middle Eastern Studies, Neville Mandel reported contacts between certain members of the Arab Decentralisation Party and the Zionist Executive. These contacts must be viewed, "within the context of the nationalists' search for allies against the Turks". (*28)

However, the Palestinians were unwilling to endorse the policy of taking the Zionists as temporary allies in the struggle against the Turks. In its issue of 9 July 1913, Falastin rebuked a leading figure of the Arab Congress, Sheikh Ahmad Tabbara, "For he did not mention what dangers were connected with the immigration of the Zionists into the country and what problems for the future are being brought by the Government's attitude on this issue". What is of interest to us in this context is

the degree of Palestinian participation in the attempts at the "Arab-Zionist entente". According to Mandel,some Arab notables were disturbed by the (anti-Zionist) popular mood. One such notable was Nassif Bey al-Khalidi, a native of Jerusalem, who in 1914 was Chief Engineer in Beirut. "(*29-) Nassif Bey's efforts to convene an Arab-Zionist conference were unsuccessful.

Zionist contacts with Palestinian Arabs in Constantinople were also abortive. Their

demands were unacceptable to the Zionists. The Arabs desired the Zionists:

(i) to assist Arab education, by supplying expertise and funds;

(ii) to give assurances that the fellaheen would not be deprived of all their land or

proletarianised by the Jewish settlers; and

(iii) to find large capital sums to finance extensive public-work projects for the

development of the Arab provinces. (*30)

In Palestine itself there were unmistakable signs of a hardening of Arab anti-Zionist feeling, in the months immediately following the Congress.

In August, Falastin informed its readers that it had to increase the number of its pages in order to publish the increasing number of petitions and protests against Zionist encroachment. On 12 August, al-Karmal reported in its front page a huge demonstration in Nablus against the intended sale of the Beisan lands to the Jews, where spirited and vehement speeches were delivered, and telegrams of protest dispatched to the authorities. Three days later, al-Karmal proposed that an anti-Zionist congress be held in Nablus to discuss ways and means of combating the Zionist peril. The proposed congress would discuss the establishment of societies to mobilise the people, improve the conditions of the peasant, create wealth and preserve it and encourage the quest for applied (practical) sciences. Al-Karmal argued that promoting the peasant's well-being and dignity would sharpen his sense of duty towards his nation. Knowledge, patriotism and solidarity were

not enough to combat the encroaching danger. What was at stake, al-Karmal concluded, was survival and in this context organised and enlightened action alone could save the day.

Many Arab newspapers and a few political groups endorsed al-Karmal's proposed congress. As no enthusiasm was shown by the leading notables, the proposal was not carried out. However, al-Karmal 's agitation for organisation was instrumental in preparing the ground for the emergence of an Anti-Zionist Society with headquarters in Nablus and branches in other Palestinian towns. This Society called for demonstrations against the Government's intended land sales by public auction, dispatched telegrams of protests and proposed that the preservation of the peasant's rights in their lands which were usurped by the Government could be achieved through annual installments. The Anti-Zionist Society led the agitation and struggle against Zionism in Palestine by setting the pace and pattern of articulation from Nablus where no Jewish element or influence existed to counteract the Society's activities. As early as 3 August, Antebi reported that, "The Anti-Zionist Society was gaining adherents and was moving into its active phase. "(*31)

Throughout September 1913, Falastin and al-Karmal devoted a great deal of space to Zionist activities in a deliberate attempt designed to inspire a desire for emulation. On 20 September, Falastin reported that a group called The Society of Jewish Youth had been formed to ensure that the Jews boycotted the local population. Less than a month later, the same paper attacked the communal Jewish law courts in Tel-Aviv and some of the Jewish settlements, suggesting that such institutions were laying the basis of "a state within a state in Palestine".

On 4 November al-Karmal published a telegram that declared all those cooperating with the Zionists to be traitors, and on 8 November Suleiman al-Taji Farouqi of the National Ottoman Party, published a poem entitled, THE ZIONIST DANGER. In this poem Farouqi did not merely denounce Jewish designs to usurp Palestine from its inhabitants, but also warned the Turkish rulers and reminded them of their duty to protect Palestine where many holy Muslim sites existed.

The Ottoman authorities were not altogether happy with the vehemence that characterised Arab opposition to Zionism in the Arabic newspapers and took disciplinary action from time to time against these newspapers.

The suspension of Arab papers began to arouse Arab suspicions that the Young Turks and the Zionists were allies in their battle against the incipient Arab national movement and Arab independence.

Organised Anti-Zionism

During the months that preceded the First World War, anti-Zionism in Palestine was at its peak. There was more evidence of organised opposition to Zionism; people who co- operated with the Zionists were unequivocally denounced; the press was extremely vocal against Zionism; and anti Zionism played a prominent part in the campaign of most candidates to the Ottoman Parliament in Palestine.

On 24 February 1914, al-Karmal reported that Arab youth in Constantinople had founded an anti-Zionist Society. Towards the end of April,'Ibry wrote to Dr Ruppin that he was sure that there existed both in Jerusalem and Jaffa special organisation of youth, both Christians and Muslims to fight us throughout Palestine by all means. '(*32)

On 14 June Falastin published a letter from R. Abu alSal'ud which disclosed the names and programmes of four nationalist and welfare societies which had recently been founded in Jerusalem to 'stand in the face of the impending dangers threatening their homeland and save their existence from destruction'. These societies were the following: alJam'iyya al-Khayriyya al-lslamiyya, jamiyyat al-lkha' wal-Afaf, Shirkat al-lqtisad al- Falastini al-Arabi and Shirkat al-Tijara al-Watania; al-Iqtisadiyya. The correspondent added that a reading club was under way where magazines, newspapers and books would be available for purposes of public education. All the above-mentioned societies preached patriotism, promoted education"(*33) and supported national industries.

In its issue of 21 June, al-lqdam published a letter from Jawdat Qandus which stated that the Palestinian students in Constantinople, together with the youth from Tyre and Marji'yun: established a society whose aim is to unite the word and bring together the hearts of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular to promote what is good for the country, and in particular, resist Zionism by all our means, if not through finance then through science,literature, and sincerity.

The founders of the Society planned to have headquarters in Jerusalem and branches in all other Palestinian towns. In the same message Qandus stated that the members of the Society were already lobbying the members of Parliament. On 5 May another newspaper, Fata al-Arab reported the existence of a society at al-Azhar called Jam'iat Muqawamat al Sahiyuniyyeen (The Society for Resisting the Zionists) which had been founded by Palestinian students. On 19 July, al-lqdam published a Manifesto of considerable length issued by the al-Azhar Society at the end of which the aims of the Society were stated:

(1) To oppose the Zionists by all possible means; by awakening public opinion and uniting views on this point; and by propagating the Society's programme among all classes of the Arab nation in general and in Syria and Palestine in particular.

(2) To found branches and societies in all the towns of Syria and Palestine for this purpose.

(3) To endeavour to spread the spirit of unity among all elements of the inhabitants.

(4) To activate and support economic, commercial and agricultural projects and enlighten the ideas of the farmers and peasants that they may be able to protect themselves from the dangers of Zionism.

(5) To make representations before all those interested in question to halt the stream of Zionist immigration.

Also in July, reports were published in ha-Herut of two societies formed under the influence of Najib Nassar. The first, in Beirut made up of a hundred young men from Nablus studying there and was called al-Shabiba al-Nabulsiyya (The Youth of Nablus).(834) Its aims to protect the rights of the Arabs and to agitate for the good of the Arab people and for the good of Syria. The Second Association was a mixed Muslim and

Christian society in Haifa called al-Muntada al-Adabi (The Literary Association), whose objectives were openly nationalist and secretly anti Zionist.

In July 1914 Palestinian Arab women emerged on the political scene when they founded Jam'iat al-lhsan al-Am (Society for Charity) and Jam'iat Yaqzat al-Fatat al-Arabiyya (Society for the Awakening of the Arab Girl). Both societies were nationalist and advocated support for local industries. (*35)

On 7 July al-Karmal published a General Summons to Palestinians which was received from Jerusalem and presumably distributed by one of the newly founded organisations in that city. The summons reflected the tense political atmosphere that prevailed in the country and attempted to mobilise Palestinian public opinion as a preparation for more drastic action: ..Do you wish to be slaves to the Zionists who have come to kick you out of your country, claiming that it is theirs... Are you, Muslims, Palestinians, .Syrians, Arabs, happy at this?

We shall die rather than let it happen.

The summons then urged the people to undertake the following action:

(1) Apply pressure on the Government to act in accordance with its law stipulating that it is completely forbidden to sell miri (state) lands to foreigners.

(2) Try to develop local (wataniyah) trade and industry. Do not trade except with your own people, as they (the Zionists) do because they do not trade with the Muslim and the Christian.

(3) Do not sell them your lands and use your power to prevent the peasant from selling. Henceforth, scatter the land agents and revile them.

(4) Be concerned to stop, by all means you can, the stream of migration from and to Palestine.

(5) Demand of your awqaf to found Arab religious schools and also other schools for crafts, agriculture and science.

(6) Trust in God and in yourselves; do not trust in the Government because it is occupied with other things. Strive that Arabic will be the language of instruction in schools. (7)You must implant in the hearts of the local population, especially the youth, love of agricultural work, of trade and industry ... The dangers threatening your country are many the greatest of all is 'the Zionist danger' so beware of it, strive, act and God will favour your deeds.

At the end of the summons al-Karmal inserted its own advice to the organisers: Mobilize public opinion so that you can achieve these objectives. You should not blame the Zionists as much as you should blame the leaders of your country and government officials who sell them lands and act as their brokers. Prevent those selling and you will halt the Zionist Movement.

The Summons revealed that as the Palestinians lost hope of any Government action against Zionist encroachment they moved towards self-organisation and self-reliance.

During the first seven months of 1914, the Palestinian Arab press played a key role in mobilising public opinion and preparing the ground for organisational and concerted action against the Zionists. The press assiduously denounced, "Those rich and influential people who were blinded by self interest; they do not see the encircling Zionist danger, and preferred to have a golden present at the expense of a dark future for their sons". (*36) The same article warned that, "he who controls the land and the economy is the real master, and the political sovereign is merely his vassal".

On 2 April 1914, Falastin published an article on 'The Zionist Danger and the Arab Press' where it expressed gratification on witnessing a general anti-Zionist campaign in Cairo, Beirut and Damascus. Falastin paid tribute to the pioneering role of al-Karmal "in the patriotic struggle" against Zionism, which was taken up soon afterwards by Falastin itself as well as al-Muqtabas, al-Ra'i al-'Am, Fatat al-'Arab and al-lslah successively. The article alleged that the few papers that failed to participate in the anti-Zionist campaign were receiving material benefits from the Zionist Movement. The writer of the article was apparently impressed by the participation of the prestigious al-Hilal magazine of Cairo in the fight against Zionism and referred to the long article published by it on the autonomous and totally insulated life led by the Jewish colonists in their settlements. The writer also acknowledged the role of al-lqdam which was the keenest of all in exposing the Zionist danger and stirring public opinion on the issue.

The Electoral Platform of 1914 Al-lqdam was a weekly paper published in Egypt in 1914; the editor was Muhammad alShanti, a Palestinian. For all intents and purposes al- lqdam was a paper devoted to Palestinian affairs and was endowed with a certain immunity on Palestinian issues, since Egypt was not under Ottoman control. From the outset al-lqdam sought to make the Zionist danger the heart of the matter in Palestinian public and political life.

It invited debate and attention through a series of interviews with the notables and political personalities. It was instrumental in bringing to the fore the Zionist danger as the main issue in the Parliamentary elections of 1914.

On the 22 March 1914, al-lqdam published three interviews with Sa'id Husseini, Ragheb Nashashibi and Salim Husseini. Sa'id Husseini pledged, if elected, to continue the fight against Zionism in Parliament as he had done in the past. He advocated the improvement of the fellah's condition and providing him with ownership titles to the land he looks after in order that he may cling to it and never give it up. He criticised the government for not fighting Zionism, which was a political as well as an economic peril, and warned that negligence would lead to grave consequences.

Ragheb Nashashibi, another incumbent Parliamentary candidate, called for special legislation aimed at the prevention of Zionist acquisition of land in Palestine. He resented the fact that many Zionists were non-Ottoman subjects who exploited the Capitulations, did not speak Arabic, and 'looked at our sons and brethren with contempt'. He pledged to fight Zionism and Zionists without injuring the feeling of Ottoman Jews. Salim Husseini expressed admiration for the Zionists and called for their emulation. He also advocated special legislation to prohibit all land sales.

A week later, al-lqdam published an interview with Khalil Sakakini, 'one of the founders of the Constitutional School in Jerusalem where the spirit of antagonism to Zionist colonialism was being propagated'. In the course of the brief interview Sakakini submitted a profound statement on the nature of the Zionist challenge: The Zionists want to own Palestine, that is, the heart of the Arab countries and the middle link between the Arab peninsula and Africa. Thus, it appears as if they want to break the chain and divide the Arab Nation (al-Ummah al-Arabiyyah) into two sections to prevent its unification and solidarity. The people should be conscious that it possesses a territory and a tongue, and if you want to kill a nation cut her tongue and occupy her territory and this is what the Zionists intend to do with the Arab Nation.

Another political personality, Faydi Alami warned that if matters continued to take the same course, The Zionists would own the country and we would be aliens'. Jamil Husseini put the whole problem, including the dilemma of the notables, in a nutshell: Resisting Zionism is a priority because it is harmful to the inhabitants of the country and aims at dispossessing them of their land. But how can we resist it and fight it when the Government lends its backing and support, and when the inhabitants are simple ignorant people. The Government employees are working in the direction of facilitating a Zionist takeover.

At about the same time a number of notables from Jerusalem, Jaffa and Gaza appealed to the members of al-Muntada al-Adabi in Constantinople and to the Turkish newspaper Pyam. The appeal spoke of the plight of the Palestinian peasant, as well as the merchant and the Government employee, because of Zionist designs and influence. "If sincere people did not come to the rescue of the Palestinians", the appeal asserted, "their fate, will be similar to that of the American Indians. Zionism, a state within the Ottoman state, threatens the very existence of the Arabs in Palestine" (*37)

In mid-April Ahmad al-Aref, a former member of Parliament, told the editor of al-lqdam that "The sole topic of conversation among Palestinians at present. ..is the Zionist issue; all are frightened and, scared of it".

On 1 1 April, Falastin had to publish a supplement/owing to the great deal of material on the Zionist Movement'. That issue carried an important article on the economic boycotts and pressures applied by the Anglo-Palestine Bank against merchants and businessmen who had signed a telegram of protest against Zionism. The article named the merchants in question, and how they had to withdraw their signatures, and even to deny that they had signed the telegram in the first place, before the boycott of the Bank was lifted. Only one merchant refused to withdraw his signature and continued to suffer from the Bank's boycott. Falastin, then, added that economic boycotts were not new but had become strict of late: Jews do not buy from Muslims and Christians, there is hardly any trace of native labour in Jewish enterprise

On 20 April 1914, the local authorities suspended Falastin on orders received from the Ministry of Interior, on the grounds that an article which had appeared on 4 April was deemed guilty of exacerbating relations between the races. Subsequent to its suspension,

Falastin issued a circular to its readers and subscribers which attacked the Government for regarding the Zionists as a race, whereas the paper contended that they were merely a political group. The paper distin- guished between a Jew and a Zionist and blamed Zionism for the prevailing tensions:

Ten years ago the Jews were living as Ottoman brothers loved by all the Ottoman races. .living in the same quarters, their children going to the same schools. The Zionists put an end to all that and prevented any intermingling with the indigenous population. They boycotted the Arabic language and the Arab merchants, and declared their intention of taking over the country from its inhabitants. (*38)

The circular quoted Dr. Urbach of the Zionist Movement as saying in Haifa that Zionism should rise against the Arabs, divide them and evict them, thus serving Ottoman interests.

Furthermore, Falastin warned the authorities that Zionism was no longer a ghost but a

tangible menace. The central government could suppress Falastin, but there were other

patriotic papers to 'carry the torch', and there was the youth of Palestine, "boiling with

anxiety over the threatened future".

The British Vice-Consul in Jaffa as well as the Consul in Jerusalem testified that the

circular 'faithfully mirrors the growing resentment among the Arabs against the Jewish

invasion'.

The anti-Zionist campaign in the press continued unabated until the eve of the First World War in August 1914. However, the outbreak of the War did not stop the Arabs from contemplating action against the Zionists.

According to Pearlman,papers seized by the Turks in 1915 outline a plan for getting rid of Zionism; the colonies were to be razed by fire, and the Jews driven out. The Zionists it was argued were the worst enemies of the Arabs, that was why the Turks were so ready to assist them'.(*40)

The Palestinians came to view the Zionists and the ruling Turkish nationalists as allies against Arab regeneration. It was not surprising that the Palestinians started contemplating violent means to overthrow Turkish hegemony on the eve of World War I as the only effective method of ridding themselves of both hostile forces. The two secret revolutionary organisations al'Ahd and al-Fatat which were active in promoting the Arab Revolt against the Turks during the war comprised many Palestinian Army Officers. Although the Arabs fought on the side of the Allies, the Allied victory brought forth a new occupation by power that had promised the Zionist movement a Jewish national home in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917. The British occupation and rule in Palestine marked a new fateful era in the country's history which forms the subject of the subsequent chapters of this study.

On reviewing the reactions of the various socioeconomic groups Zionism, i.e. Jewish immigration and Jewish settlement between 1881 and 1914, certain patterns emerge. These patterns of reactions were related, by and large, to socioeconomic factors.

The big landowners who were willing to sell their lands to the Zionists were mostly absentee landlords from outside Palestine proper e.g. the Sursuqs or city merchants who had minimal contact with the peasants and no sympathy for their plight. Besides, these two category of landowners did not derive their social power from land ownership. The traditional land owning families whose social standing depended on their land holdings and who constituted the notables' were reluctant to sell their lands to the Zionists for fear of undermining the base of their status.

Some, like Nassif Khalidi, were disturbed by popular agitation and sought accommodation with the Zionists. However,in much as Zionism aimed at taking over the country, the notables recognised the threat to their existence and position and sought to combat the Zionist peril by performing their role as intermediaries between ruler and ruled. The notables sought to fight Zionism by appealing to the authorities, the Mutasarrif, the central Government and Parliament, to restrict Jewish immigration and prohibit land sale to the Zionists. This role could only be effective, or indeed feasible long as the authorities were willing to respect the notables' appeals and maintain their position in society. Following the Young Turks Revolution, the notables' position and importance in articulating political demands was undermined.

The middle classes, professionals, artisans and literary groups we apprehensive of the professional competition and the political challenge introduced by Zionism in Palestine. Newspaper editors and students belonged to these classes and were instrumental in mobilising the public against the Zionist peril' as well as forming the backbone of political and semi-political organisations established to combat Zionism. It was the vocal and active groups of newspapermen and students that were outbidding the notables in the fight against Zionism.

The reaction of the peasants was less sophisticated and more violent as they were the direct victims of Zionist land acquisitions, especially the second aliya and the introduction of Kibush Avodah. Almost attacks on Jewish settlements were undertaken by destitute peasants were evicted as a result of land sales to the Zionists. Thus, within the ranks of the nationalist movement in Palestine, the notables performed the role of the diplomats, the educated middle classes that of the articulators of public opinion and the peasants that the actual fighters in the battle against the Zionist presence.

Notes

1. Neville Mandei, Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine 1882-1 914, pp.L64d5.

2. H. Frank to Antebi, 8 November 1908, AIU VIII E.25,quoted in Mandei, op. cit., p.168.

3. For clashes between the peasants and the colonists, see Mandei, op. cit., pp. 171-9. J.C.A. stands for Jewish Colonisation Association.

4. Ibid.

5. The Manuscript is presented under the custody of Professor Walid Khalidi. The authorship is not definitely known though it is almost certainly that of Ruhi al-Khalidi, a leading politician and intellectualin Palestine in the first two decades of the twentieth

century.

6. Interview with Haj Amin el-Husseini, Beirut, Summer 1966.

7. The prefix (al) before family names is henceforth eliminated wherever convenient. It is possible that withholding of these Muslim notables' names was an act of political prudence on the part of the author.

8. 2he Jewish Chronicle, London, 18 June 1909.

9. Mandel, op.cit., p. 204. Al-Karmal was founded in Haifa.

10. The Jewish Chronicle, 18 June 1909.

11. AI- Ahmed, 7 October 1909.

12. Albert Antebi to Frank, 18 October 1909, AIU IX E.27 quoted in Mandel, op.cit. p.214.

13. Le Jeune Turc, Constantinople, 7 May 1910.

14. Mandel, op.cit., pp.209-10.

15. 13 June 1910, FO 195/235, Minute on folder to No.25.

16. For Nassar's influence see Falastin (Palestine), 2 April 1914.

17. Arthur Ruppin (Jaffa) to ZCO, 31 March 191 1,CZA 22/635, quoted in Mandel, op.cit., p.251.

18. 21 June 1911, JCA 268/enclosure No. 195. Ibid pp.268-9.

19. Arthur Ruppin to ZCO, 31 March 1911,op.cit.,

20. The Red Passport was a measure initiated to stem the flow of immigrants posing as tourists. The original passport of the tourist was retained at the point of entry and a red slip was issued as a receipt

which would entitle the owner to redeem his passport on leaving Palestine.

21. Ha'olam, vol.V (1911), quoted in Moshe Pearlman, 'Chapters of Arab- Jewish Diplomacy', in Jewish Social Studies, 1944.

22. See Mandel, op.cit., p. 300.

23. Arthur Ruppin to ZAC, 2 May 1912, CZA 23/144 8, quoted in Mandel, op.cit.p.296.

24. Falastin, 24 November 1912, accused the Zionists of sowing the seeds of Muslim Christian strife through publishing letters, under Muslim names, designed to cause ill-will between the two communities.

25. Falastin, 5 June 1913.

26. Very little is known about this society beyond the fact that it included Christians as well as Muslim.

27. For names of participants and texts of telegrams see al-Mu'tamnra al-Arabi al-Awwal (The First Arab Congress) published by the Supreme Committee of the Decentralisation Party in Egypt (Cairo, 1913).

28. Neville Mandel, Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente, 1913-1914, Middle Eastern Studies, vol., no. 3, April 1965 p. 241.

29. Ibid., p.251.

30. Ibid., p.258.

31. Antebi to President of JCA, 31 August 1913, JCA 2681no.218, quoted in Mandel, op.cit., p. 390.

32. Quoted in Mandel, op.cit. p.476.

33. An educated Arab, Husni Khayyal, advocated the establishment of a college with Arabic as the language of instruction (aL-lqdam, Cairo, 14 June 1914). An unsigned manifesto distributed in Jerusalem in July 1914 called for the establishment of industrial

and agricultural schools (al-Karmal, 7 July 1914).

34. In June 1914 Nablus's Administrative Council prohibited all sales of land to the Zionists irrespective of their nationality (Falastin, 27 June 1914).

35. AI-Karmal, 7 July 1914.

36. Falastin, 26 March 1914.

37. Falastin, 29 March, 1914.

38. Ibid., 29 April 1914.

39. McGregor to Mallet, 30 April 1914, FO 371/2134/2236, no.31.

40. Jewish Social Studies, p. 125.

Chapter 3

POLARISATION: THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 1917-1920

Between the summer of 1914 and the autumn of 1917, Palestine internal political scene was overtaken by the First World War. Politically active elements in Palestine - Southern Syria as it was known then - were plotting against the Ottoman Empire in interests of the Arab Revolt and Arab independence. The Palestinians nevertheless, were not unmindful of the dangers posed by the Zionists.

In a report prepared by the Arab Bureau (a British military institution based in Cairo) during the early months of 1917, British officials were informed that 'There has already been formed in Jerusalem a society of the better class and better educated Moslems for resisting Jewish colonisation'.(*l)

A more revealing report on the political situation in Palestine was filed during the first weeks of January 1917 by Captain William Ormsby-Gore of the Arab Bureau. (*2) The report described certain aspects of the political power structure in Jerusalem, and the attitude of the Palestinian Arabs towards the Turks, the British and the Zionists. " In Palestine nobody - except the German Colonists - likes the Turks, least of all do the oppressed peasantry". (*3)

The notable Muslim families - the Hussainis, the Khalidis, the Nashashibis and the Dawudis - were pro-British and sent their sons to English schools to be educated;

The Moslems of Jerusalem and neighbourhood are well disposed toward the Christians, but very anti-Jewish, or to be more precise - Anti-Zionist. They strongly object to the growth in number and influence of the Jewish colonies in town and country and particularly to the purchase of land by the Zionists and dispossession of the Moslem population.

The writer further added that the opposition of the old Turks and Arab representatives in the Ottoman Parliament to Zionist acquisition of land was quite ineffectual. The ineffectiveness of the anti-Zionist Arab effort in the Ottoman parliament encouraged the Palestinian Arabs to join secret Arab societies which were dedicated to Arab autonomy and later worked for Arab independence. The Palestinians conspicuous role in

these secret societies was made public when Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman supreme military commander in charge of the Arab front, sent a number of Arab political leaders to the gallows on charges of conspiracy against the state. Salim Abdul-Hadi, Ali Omar Nashashibi and Muhammad al-Shanti were among those who were hanged. Hafez al-Said and Sheikh Sa'id al-Karmi had their sentences commuted to imprisonment for life on account of their advanced years and Hasan Hammad had a miraculous escape. When the Sharif of Mecca, later King Hussein declared the Arab Revolt against the Turks, a number of Palestinian officers joined his ranks. (*4)

Before the Sharif declared his revolt, he reached an understanding with the British High Commissioner (H.Cr.) in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon. In the correspondence between McMahon and Hussein Britain pledged to recognise and support Arab independence within certain specified frontiers in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in return for Hussein's declaration of war on Turkey.(*5)

The question whether Palestine was to be included within those frontier or not became a controversial question after the end of the War. Whatever the British real intentions at that time, the Arabs were under the impression that Palestine was included in the proposed independent Arab state which Britain promised to recognise. It is certain(*6) that Palestine was included in the Arab State which Britain would, through McMahon, be pledged to recognise. The cause of the controversy over this can only be understood in the light of other commitments to the Zionists and to the French during the war. Simultaneously with the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the British were secretly negotiating with their French allies the respective territorial desiderata in the Ottoman Empire. These negotiations culminated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916, according to which Palestine was to have an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia,and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Sharif of Mecca.(*7)

But before the end of the War Britain undertook another major commitment regarding the future of Palestine in the form of a letter dated 2 November 1917, from Lord Balfour, Britain's Foreign Secretary to Lord Rothschild, the leading Jewish personality in Britain: His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.(*8)

Aware of the nature of Arab feeling regarding the future of Palestine,(*9) the British Government tried to prevent any discussion of the Zionist subject during the War. When the Sharif's newspaper AL-QIBLA published, in the latter part of 1916, an article about Zionism, General MacDonogh of British Intelligence directed General Clayton, Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force and head of the Arab Bureau, to communicate a "serious and personal warnings to the Sharif and to urge him 'to do his utmost to prevent discussions of this dangerous topic' (*10)

These British efforts prevented the erosion of Arab goodwill and 'British troops were welcomed as liberators' and 'the attitude of the Arabs in Palestine, passive and active, contributed to their success, (*1 1) General Allenby and his Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) entered Jerusalem 11 December 1917, less than six weeks after Balfour's Declaration.

Days after Allenby's entry into Jerusalem, Colonel Deedes of the BEF reported the initial

reactions to the Balfour Declaration as follows:

The news of Mr. Balfour's declaration regarding Palestine is new to

Jerusalem and had caused no little apprehension amongst other elements,

the latter I am warned are trying to see me. (*12)

During the same week Deedes reported exacerbation of relations between

Arab and Jew in Palestine as a result of the Declaration.

Jewish Colonists profess to wish to be self-supporting without Arab labour... There is

occasionally noticeable an anti-Arab feeling which is reciprocated and recently rather

accentuated, as you are aware, by the Balfour pronouncement. In a word friction is not

absent.(*13)

General Clayton of the Arab Bureau lost no time in drawing the attention of London to

the ramifications and likely effects of the Declaration on future Anglo-Arab relations in

Palestine:

The policy which is enunciated in clause No. 4 (regarding Jewish Colonization in

Palestine) will meet with strong opposition from both Christian and Moslem Arabs who

have already shown distrust of the lengths to which H.M. Government are prepared to go

as consequence of Mr. Balfour's announcement to the Zionists.(*14)

Two weeks earlier, Clayton had laid the alternatives before Sykes. We have therefore to consider whether the situation demands out and out support of Zionism at the risk of alienating the Arabs at a critical moment. (*15) In a memorandum to the War Cabinet circulated to the alternatives set out by Clayton. 'Palestine and our Zionist declaration combined gives us and the Entente as a whole a hold over the vital vocal and sentimental forces of Jewry'. (* 16)

A Crowd of Weeds

Sykes added that a "crowd of weeds" were growing around British (political) assets in the area, the first of the weeds on his list was "Arab unrest in regard to Zionism. "(*17)

In view of Palestinian Arab reactions to the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish National Home policy, the Military Authorities, who were primarily bent on winning the War and preserving peace and order in the country, withheld publication of the Declaration in Palestine throughout the period of the military administration and attempted to stick to the Law and Usages of War.(*18) However, according to Colonel Ronald Storrs, the Military Governor of Jerusalem during the period of the Military Occupation. The Military Administration notably contravened the Status Quo, in the matter of Zionism... General Allenby's very first proclamation and all that issued from me were in Hebrew, as well as in English and Arabic. Departmental and public notices were in Hebrew and, soon as possible, official and

municipal receipts also. We had Jewish officers on our staffs, Jewish Clerks and interpreters in our offices.

For these deliberate and vital infractions of military practice OETA was criticized both within and without Palestine. (*19)

This, however, did not satisfy many leading Zionists in Palestine who were anxious to turn Palestine into a Jewish State "as Jewish as England is English" (*20) as soon as possible. Dr. Weizmann, the Zionist leader, proposed that 'the whole administration of Palestine shall be so formed as to make of Palestine a Jewish Commonwealth under British Trusteeship'. (*21) Zionist impatience led to a certain amount of friction between the home authorities, who were willing to give way to Zionist schemes and pressures, and the local British authorities in Palestine and Egypt who were responsible for carrying out the Zionist policies in the face of Arab resentment and counter-pressures.

Indicative of the pace contemplated by Balfour and Weizmann was the interview in December 1918, at the Foreign Office, where the Zionist leader revealed his plans to the British Foreign Secretary: a community of four to five million Jews in Palestine., from which the Jews could radiate out into the Near East... But all this pre- supposes free and unfettered development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine not mere facilities for colonisation. (*22)

The British were less concerned about these grandiose plans at that time than they were about preserving their war position in the area. To achieve this end an Arab-Zionist understanding was deemed necessary.

Forcing the hand of King Hussein on the Zionist issue was the first step in this direction: In this matter it should be pointed out to the King that the friendship of world Jewry to the Arab cause is equivalent to support in all States where Jews have political influence. (*23)

Furthermore, as a result of Clayton's efforts, the Arab Committee in, Cairo, alias the Syrian Welfare Committee, undertook to send emissaries to Palestine to persuade the Palestinian Arabs to take conciliatory attitude towards Zionism.

These efforts did not allay Arab suspicions in Palestine. Clayton's weekly reports from Jerusalem consistently talked of Palestinian uneasiness at Zionist activity and distrust of Britain's "Zionist policy". Towards the end of February 1918, Clayton reported that "Educated Moslems are still much disturbed at what they deem preferential treatment of the Jews and at the possibility of Jewish domination. "(*24)

Owing to the general war considerations, the British Government was anxious that a Zionist Commission visit Palestine, headed by Weizmann with Captain W. Ormsby Gore as its liaison officer. The Foreign Office informed Wingate that the more Object of Commission is to carry out subject to General Allenby's authority any steps required to give effect to Government declaration in favour of establishment in Palestine of a national home for Jewish people. ..and at the same time allay Arab suspicions regarding true aims of Zionism. (*25)

Before the Zionist Commission reached Palestine the Palestinian Arabs were able to

transform their feelings of shock and apprehension into organisational effort as a means

of promoting the expression and the effectiveness of their opposition to Zionist aims in

Palestine.

Inevitably the temptation to imitate the enemy's techniques was present.

From Jerusalem, Clayton reported to his superiors:

Moslems are still nervous regarding progress of Zionist movement.

There are indications that Moslems think that British Authorities intend to set up a Jewish

Government but that France will intervene and oppose a Zionist State, ... Christians share

Moslem's apprehensions. There is a movement in Jaffa amongst the Moslems and

Christians to appoint an official committee to further Christian and Moslem interests on

similar lines to Jewish Committees. (*26)

This movement culminated in the emergence of the Muslim-Chrirtian Committees which were similar to Zionist and Jewish organisations in an effort to act as a counter-force to the Jewish organisation.

Muslim-Christian Committees were mainly dominated by the leading notables and merchants in the major cities and towns of Palestine.

The British officials in the area endeavoured to create a conciliatory atmosphere on the eve of the Zionist Commission's visit and made a concerted effort to bring forth an Arab- Zionist entente. (*27) These efforts were directed at the traditional centres of political influence and power. Thus towards the end of March the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces paid a visit to the Mufti in Jerusalem which " produced excellent effect throughout Moslem community". (*28)

Clayton lost no time in convincing pro-British Syrian politicians in Cairo, working for an Arab state in Syria, that Weizmann was working for a 'British Palestine'. He succeeded in persuading "Fawzi el-Bakri, an El Azm, a Nashashibi, an Abd el-Hadi, Dr. Farouk..to communicate with their friends in Palestine to quiet their fears and reassure them'.(*29)

Yet when Weizmann and his Zionist Commission reached Palestine during the first week of April 1918, he discovered that "Arab agitators lost no time in proclaiming that "the British had sent for the Jews to take over the country'". (*30)

In a more optimistic frame of mind Clayton expected that meetings between members of the Commission and leading local notables will do much to dissipate apprehension of Christians and Moslem committees in Palestine. (*31)

Clayton's hopes notwithstanding, the Commission's visit did little to promote an Arab- Zionist entente. In a long report to the Foreign Secretary (Balfour), Ormsby-Gore gave a detailed account of the reception accorded to it by the various communities, as well as its activities and the problems thereof. The report, though restrained, did not fail to reflect Palestinian opposition to the Balfour Declaration and the JNH policy: ...It would be idle to deny the existence of a good deal of mutual suspicion on the part of

both Jews and Arabs. ..The Arabs are generally apprehensive of expropriation by the Jews and the loss of social and political prestige; on the other side the Jews are frightened of Arab fanaticism, intrigue and attempts at domination'.

A Symptomatic Incident

Ormsby-Gore then reported a symptomatic incident signifying the political deadlock in the triangular Arab-British-Zionist relations in Palestine. The incident was referred to as the language controversy', which was precipitated by a recommendation submitted by the Arab majority of the Municipal Council of Jaffa (nominated by the Military Governor) that Arabic should be regarded as the only official language. The Jewish minority (two out of nine members) protested and the British Military Governor refused to enforce the Council's recommendation. The language controversy' engendered political tension in Jaffa and barred the establishment of friendly contacts between the Zionist Commission and the town's notables. It also pointed out the course of action the Arabs were likely to adopt in representative councils, and the incompatibility of Palestinian Arab self-determination with the Balfour Declaration and Zionist aims in Palestine.

In Jerusalem, however, Storrs managed to arrange a meeting in his office between the members of the Commission and a representative gathering of the leading personalities of the City. This gathering included the three chief members of the Husseini family who, from the official positions which they hold and from the universal respect they command, not only in Jerusalem but in the whole of Southern Palestine, may be regarded as being the most representative Arab leaders in the occupied part of Palestine. (33) On the following day Weizmann paid a visit to Ismail Husseini where his cousin the Mufti Kamel Husseini was also present. Weizmann tried to allay the fears of his hosts on various questions which have caused alarm among the Palestinians and touched upon the question which agitates most closely the minds of Arab leaders, viz, the Land Question. He assured his hosts the expropriation or the driving out from Palestine by economic means of the Arab proprietors or Arab fellaheen was the last thing he desired. (34)

Ormsby Gore reported that the two Arab notables were guarded in their replies. His report, however, overlooked an important incident, which reflected the political mood in Palestine, that took place in Jerusalem during the Commission's visit to the Holy City. The incident has three known versions. The Palestine News which was issued by the British in Cairo towards the end of the War, reported in its issue of 25 April the following item:

A group of Muslim literary figures in Jerusalem presented, on the 1 1th and 12th of April, a play 'The Maid of Adnan and Arab Chivalry' at the Rashidiah School Club. A big map of Palestine was conspicuously displayed in a prominent place in the club with the following lines of poetry inscribed under it: The Blessed Land of Palestine Is the Land of the sons of Ya'rub

0 the best land of all do not despair

1 have no other love but you,

We shall sacrifice our souls for your sake And you shall soar to great heights

Until you become like the sun in its zenith Giving light to East and West. (35)

An agitated Weizmann provided a more animated account of the same incident, which took place on the 1 1 April, in a report to Ormsby-Gore on the political situation in Palestine:

...Both speakers used the kind of language which would be appropriate if an attempt were on foot to enslave and ruin the Arabs of Palestine. They called on the Nation to awake from its torpor, and to rise up in defence of its land, of its liberty, of its sacred places against those who were coming to rob it of everything. One speaker adjured his hearers not to sell a single inch of land. Nor is that all. Both speakers took it for granted that Palestine was and must remain a purely Arab country. In fact, a map of Palestine bearing the inscription 'La Palestine Arabe' was prominently displayed, and the speeches concluded with the expressions 'Vive La Nation Arabe'(36)

In contradistinction to the Arab attitude, Weizmann described Jewish meeting where a warm tribute of gratitude was paid to the British Government for Balfour's Declaration. In view of these considerations, Weizmann concluded that the British should authoritatively explain to the Arabs the exact meaning and scope of the Balfour Declaration and then proceed to tell them that it is their duty to conform to it'.

A week after Weizmann submitted his report to Ormsby-Gore Storrs retorted with a strongly worded rejoinder in which he described Weizmann account as misleading and blamed the Zionists for the prevailing tension in Palestine. He also criticised the Zionist Commission for refraining from making public announcements of a nature that would 'dispel the pardonable anxieties of the Arab population of Palestine". (37)

An Intelligence Report filed during the third week of April provided 'a good idea of the

angle from which the man in the street regards the whole business':

The political effect of the visit of the Commission is not a favourable one so

far... Christians and Moslems do not feel any easier in their minds about their future, and

are still fearful of their rights being interfered with in case of the realisation of what they

imagine are the Zionists' aspiration; they are going ahead in forming Committee! to look

after their own interests. (38)

In a revealing letter to Judge Brandeis, a leading American Zionist Weizmann confirmed the above report of the situation:

The non-Jewish Community, especially the Arabs, both Mohammedan and Christian, interpreted the Declaration as an intention of the British Government to set up a Jewish Government at the end of the War, to deprive the Arabs of their land and cast them from the country. They looked upon the Commission as the advanced guard of Jewish capitalists and expropriators, and naturally have received with the greatest amount of suspicion. (39)

As for the British authorities in the area Weizmann informed Brandeis that 'the British officials have tried their best before our arrival to allay the suspicions of the Arabs both in Egypt and Palestine.

On 8 May, the Military Governor of Jaffa summoned the political and religious notables of the Arab port to meet Weizmann. After listening to Weizmann's speech, an Arab spokesman assured the Zionist leader that Both Moslems and Christians shall treat their compatriot the Jews as they treat one another so long as the Jews regard and respect the rights of these two religions, thus confirming their words by their action'. The Palestinian spokesman availed himself of the opportunity to demand that Great Britain will allow representation of the Moslems and Christians to attend the sittings of the Convention or the body of men that have to consider and settle the question of this country. '(40)

Shortly after hearing the Palestinian demand Weizmann hastened to write to Balfour arguing against the application of the democratic system as it 'does not take into account the superiority of the Jew to the Arab the fundamental qualitative difference between Arab and Jew'. (41) In the same letter Weizmann put forth proposals for the founding of a Hebrew University, the handing over of the Wailing Wall to the Jews and the acquisition of Crown, waste and unoccupied lands in Palestine by the Zionists. (42) The Zionist leader then proceeded to submit to the British Foreign Secretary a plan to circumvent Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism:

The problem of our relations with the Palestinian Arabs is an economic problem, not a political one. From the political point of view the Arab centre of gravity is not Palestine, but the Hedjaz, really the triangle formed by Mecca, Damascus and Baghdad. I am just setting out on a visit to the son of the King of the Hedjaz. I propose to tell him that if he wants to build up a strong and prosperous Arab kingdom, it is we Jews who will be able to help him and we only. We can give him the necessary assistance in money and in organising power. We shall be his neighbours and we do not represent any danger to him, as we are not and never shall be a great power. We are natural intermediaries between Great Britain and the Hedjaz.

Weizmann's meeting with Faisal took place on June 1918 at Wahida. According to Colonel Joyce's report the meeting was cordial but Faisal was noncommittal:

Sharif Faisal declared that as an Arab he could not discuss the future of Palestine either as a Jewish Colony or a country under British Protection. These questions were already the subject of such German and Turkish propaganda and would undoubtedly be misunderstood by the uneducated Bedouins if openly discussed, later on when Arab affairs were more consolidated these questions could be brought up(43)

At a meeting of the London Zionist Political Committee held on 16 August, Nahum Sokolow, who was in the chair, confirmed the purpose of the Zionist contacts with the Arabs outside Palestine (Cairo and Hedjaz), when he said that the Zionists 'hoped to entertain the best Relations with the real representatives of Arabs outside Palestine so as to influence the Arabs inside Palestine. (44)

The Zionist efforts in this direction were spurred by the tactics of the Palestinian Arab leadership. For as the convergence in British policies and Zionist aims in Palestine became clearer, the Palestinian Arabs sought to restore the balance of power by closer alliance with the main Arab movement. During the second half of May 1918, the Palestinians adopted the Arab Flag' and the Arab Anthem' (of the Arab Revolt) as Palestine's own.

The Palestinians quest for greater Arab concern and backing was not their sole reaction to the impending dangers. Spurred by the Zionist challenge, the Palestinians tried to set up political, social and educational institutions in an effort to achieve greater internal cohesion and revival, which was deemed all the more necessary in view of the possibility -of being politically isolated and denied contact with the neighbouring Arabs.

On 6 June The Palestine News reported the founding of the following societies in Jaffa: Dar al-Ulum al-lslamiyya (The Islamic School for Sciences), Jam'iat al-Shabiba al- Yafiyya (The Jaffa Youth Society), Jam'iat al- Ta'awun al-Massihi (The Social Christian Welfare Association), and Al-Jam'ia al-Ahliyya (The National Society) which was similar to the local Zionist Organisation, composed of Jaffa's leading Muslim and Christian families and was responsible for dealing with the Government.

Other efforts were directed at thwarting Zionist efforts by practical means. During June a member of the British political staff in Palestine reported that in Jerusalem ...a society was being formed by Christians and Moslems with program to combat Jewish predominance; to counteract Jewish influence and to impede by all possible means, the purchase of land by the Jews. (46)

Another important literary-political association al-Nadi al-Arabi, (The Arab Club) was

reactivated in Jerusalem during June 1918 by Amin al-Husseini (brother of the Mufti

Kamel al-Husseini and young Jerusalemites ostensibly dedicated to the revival of the

Arabic language and literature. (47)

During August 1918, it was reported that al-Jam'ia al-lslamiyya ( Islamic Society)

founded some years earlier in Jerusalem 'with a view preserving Muslim property from

being acquired or exploited by Christians or Jews', was reactived.(48 )

Another society al-lkha' wal Afaf (Brotherhood and Chastity) closely connected with

guarding Muslim property was reported as being active on a later date. (49)

In one of his more perceptive reports on the political situation Clayton provided an

account of the economic factors at play within ranks of Palestinian Arab opposition to

Zionism:

Class Attitudes

The great majority of the more or less educated Arabs regard any prospect of Zionist extension with fear and dislike. The small land- owner with his shiftless and antiquated methods of cultivation realises that he cannot hold his own against Jewish science and energy; the trader foresees the day when Jewish enterprise, backed by Jewish money and employing modern business methods will inevitably squeeze him off the market; the small Effendi, whose one ambition has always been to secure a Government appointment,

sees an administration in which the better educated and more intelligent Jew, will predominate, thereby lessening the chances for him and for his class of obtaining the coveted official post... classes to which I have alluded above will spare no effort to induce in the peasantry a hostile attitude towards the Jews. They are in loser touch with the lower strata of society than any other class, and it is not difficult for them to persuade an ignorant and gullible population that Zionism is only another word for robbing them of their lands and even of their means of livelihood. (*50)

Clayton apparently neglected to add the city and town workers (Porters, dock-workers, labourers engaged in traditional industries, etc.). According to Ormsby-Gore, 'The main problem is the competition etween Jewish and Arab labour'. (*51) It should be pointed out that some of the classes referred to in Clayton's report had, in spite of their opposition to Zionism, a vested interest in befriending the prevailing government on which their economic well-being and ambitions depended. Thus, in spite of a clear convergence of British policy and Zionism in Palestine, no public manifestations of Palestinian Arab antipathy to British military occupation on a mass scale were discernible and recruiting for Faisal's army 'as still going on.(*52) Some Palestinian notables were trying through personal contacts and diplomacy to dissuade British officials on the spot from supporting Zionism.

In August 1918, Ormsby-Gore reported that 'The Moslem-Effendi class which has no real political cohesion and above all no power of organisation is either pro- Turk or pro- British' and in any case they 'will not dare to do anything to embarrass a British military administration backed with British bayonets'. (*53)

This did not mean that the Palestinian Arabs were not constantly protesting and complaining against the British pro-Zionist policy:

The Christians complain of favouritism shown by the authorities to the Jew. The Moslems complain among other things that the Sharif has no representative and played no part in the entry into Jerusalem and that recruiting for Feisal's Anny has only just been allowed as we have only conceded it because we had to send the majority of our troops to France. ..It is incontestable that the policy has geatly added to our difficulties. (*54)

The considerations that Ormsby-Gore referred to were real and as long as the War was going on, the political notables and their Muslim- Christian Societies were unable to articulate Palestinian Arab opposi- tion to Zionism in any effective manner. On 4 August Clayton reported that;

The Moslem-Christian Committee at Jaffa have resigned, having entirely failed to fulfil its purpose of watching over interests of Moslem and Christian Arabs. The Military Governor is taking steps to form a new Committee.(*55)

Inability to change the situation by the application of internal pressure led to an abortive attempt at a world-wide Christian-Muslim appeal on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine, which was published by al-Mustaqbal, the Parisian Arabic paper .(*56) In a letter of protest to Picot, Sykes described the article as 'incendiary and seditious' as it called for an 'anti-Zionist War Fund'.(*57)

Strategic Considerations

As the War drew nearer to its conclusion the local British authorities found it increasingly difficult to apply pro-Zionist policy in Palestine and requested greater leeway and more autonomy in the carrying out of this policy .(*58) Simultaneously, the British were inclined to adopt an increasingly intransigent attitude regarding the necessity of retaining control over Palestine in view of its strategic importance to the defence of the Suez Canal. A memorandum on 'The Future of Palestine' by L.S. Amery of the War Office, later Colonial Secretary, stressed that

Strategically Palestine and Egypt go together. Not only is Palestine a necessary buffer to the Suez Canal, but conversely, any defence of Palestine would have its main base at Kantara. ..Palestine is geographically practically in the centre of the British Empire. (*59)

The logical conclusions of this line of thinking were drawn in a memorandum by the General Staff at the War Office :

The creation of a buffer Jewish State in Palestine, though this State will be weak in itself, is strategically desirable for Great Britain so long as it can be created without disturbing Moharnmadan sentiment and is not controlled by a power which is potentially hostile to this country .(*60)

The first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration was a testing ground for the emerging attitudes and relationships of the three sides of the Palestinian triangle. When the Arabs heard that the Zionists intended to celebrate the anniversary of Balfour's Declaration, they threatened 'breaking up the proceedings by a counter procession'.(*61) Storrs threatened that any Arab who dared do such a thing would be arrested and instantly put in jail. The Military Governor of Jerusalem advised the Zionists to break their processions before they reached the Jaffa Gate where the Arabs assemble daily in numbers. Two school processions disregarded these instructions and a scuffle with two Palestinian Arabs, one Muslim and the other Clristian, developed, and both received four months jail sentences which Storrs described as severe.

The result was the first Arab demonstration led by the Mayor, Musa Kazem Pasha al- Husseini, who submitted written protestations to the Government. Another petition of protest was addressed to the American Government. (*62)

New Tactics

One week after the War was brought to an end, Clayton detected an incipient transformation in the Palestinian Arab methods of opposition to Zionism: Christian and Moslem antipathy to Zionism has been displayed much more openly since Armistice. The recent Anglo-French declaration has encouraged all parties to make known their wishes by every available means in view of approaching Peace Conference. (*63)

On the occasion of the first anniversary of Allenby's victory over the Turks, the Muslim- Christian Committee of Jaffa submitted a memorandum to the Military Governor which testified to the accuracy of Clayton's report and mirrored the prevailing Palestinian reactions to Zionism and their arguments against the Balfour Declaration. The memorandum started out by paying tribute to Great Britain and reiterated the

Committee's faith in Mr Lloyd George 's declaration regarding 'self-government for the Arabs' and President Wilson's declarations regarding 'national self-determination '. The memorandum then proceeded to affirm that Palestine was an Arab country in the full meaning of the word and expounded a full refutation of the possible Zionist arguments:

If the country be the pretext, we should hasten to say that the country as well as the inhabitants are Arabs. If the numbers be the pretext, it should not be forgotten that the Arabs are 30 times more numerous than the Jews. If majority of the land be the pretext, the Jews must be warned that the portion they possess in Palestine is nothing more than 1/500 comparatively to the possessions of Moslems and Christians. Is it for the language? Then it is fairly well known that the language of this country is pure Arab.(*64)

The Zionist claim to Palestine, the Committee argued, 'suggests the impracticable

necessity of drawing up quite a new map of the world'. In any case the Palestinian Arabs

can never support to be subjugated, on the contrary try to hold fast in our National right

up to death.

We, Arabs, are not hostile to the others, and never entertain the least idea to expel other

elements from our country wherein we cannot agree to see that our guests the Jews are

going to frustrate us from political rights as we are unwilling to consider as native the

people who come from outside our country.

We refuse to see millions of Jews coming into Palestine, for they will engross and

monopolise all the product of Palestine, as it should not be forgotten to state the Jew likes

only the Jew, help the Jew and nobody else.

Undoubtedly, such deeds will be the cause of successive revolutions which will ruin the

country and be the misfortune of the inhabitants. ...Then the Jews be informed, that

Palestine belongs to us, and will never part with it; they must also know that we are born

in Palestine wherein we hope to die and be buried in its holy grounds.

The memorandum was conciliatory towards Britain and uncompromising towards the Zionists in conformity with the general policy adopted by the Arab political notability in Palestine. However, it was not unlikely that the members of the Jaffa Muslim-Christian Committee were more friendly to the British than other Committees in view of their trading and citrus interests which depended to a great extent on the goodwill and policies of the Government. Another factor in the (Jaffa) Committee's attitude towards the British Government may be attributed to the relatively friendly disposition of Colonel Hubbard, the Military Governor, who was in favour of a more even-handed British policy in Palestine. (*65) Following a visit to Jerusalem, Sykes observed that there were two Arab complaints:

(I) The Zionists are aggressive, demonstrative and provocative, and threaten them with a Jewish Government.

(II) The British Home Government is acting in such a way that the Palestinian Arabs will sooner or later become subject to Jewish rule.(*66)

However, Sykes detected a feeling among the Arabs that the declaration really does not amount to much and that the Arabs have only to agitate in order to get it shelved or rendered nugatory.

Nevertheless, Sykes genuinely feared 'that non-Jews may think best demonstration is violent outbreak'.

Contemplated violence was not the only problem which faced British officials in Palestine. To the embarrassment of the British authorities the Palestinians raised the issue of the unity of Syria and Palestine. During the second half of November, eighteen copies of the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November were distributed. On the following day a deputation of Muslims and Christians called on Storrs. After offering to the Allies their sincere thanks for the Declaration, they asked Storrs formally:

(a) Whether Palestine formed or did not form part of Syria.

(b) Whether, if so , Palestine came under the category of those inhabitants of the liberated countries who were invited to choose their own futures; and

(c) If, not, why the notices had been sent to them at all.(*67)

In his report of the incident, Storr also spoke about the solidarity between the Muslim and Christian Arabs and their united stand regard- ing 'their acceptance of the Anglo-French Declaration and their desire for a Sherifian Government'. (*68) Days later Storrs reported that, in addition to the formation of a Christian-Muslim Arab Committee in Jerusalem, daily meetings were reported to me at the Muktataf al-Drus School, the name of which has now been changed to the Arab Club. Two main decisions were taken at these meetings (1) that a signed petition should be sent to the French Commissariat begging that Palestine might be formally included in Syria, and (2) that on Friday last the 22nd the name of the Sherif should be pronounced as Caliph. (*69)

The Traditional Leadership's Dilemma

Storrs lost no time in sending for the Mufti to instruct him to dissuade those under his influence from adopting the second decision. He also sought to break the new organisation by calling on the Mayor and other leading figures of the Christian-Muslim Arab Committee who held official posts in the Administration: to opt for an dministrative or political career, the two being for the present incompatible.

The Mayor seemed grateful for this warning, which enabled him to say that he thought he would be more useful to his country as President of the Municipality. 70

The efficacy of Storrs' threats demonstrated the inadequacy of the traditional political notability to lead the populace in situations of conflict. When faced with a choice between a salaried government career and an uncertain future as popular political leaders, the elderly notables opted for the safer and more remunerative alternative. In 1919 the realities of a long-term pro-Zionist British policy in Palestine became undeniably clear, and Palestinian political circles were confronted with a grave choice that could not be sidestepped or ignored. The alternatives were acquiescence or defiance. Although the opposition to Zionism was virtually universal among the Palestinian Arabs, an important sector (class or group) of elderly notables took the course of acquiescence, and new forces began to compete with the propertied notables for political leadership. These comprised the active and vocal members of the educated middle classes in addition to the 'young bloods' some of whom were members of the urban and rural upper classes. In January 1919, the first Scout organisation and the first Arab Women's Club were founded. 71

The struggle between the quiescent elderly propertied notables and the activist young educated members of the middle classes became apparent in the Palestine Arab Conference which met in Jerusalem between 27 January and 10 February 1919. The Conference, which comprised delegates from Muslim-Christian Societies from various parts of Palestine, was called to discuss the presentation of Palestinian demands for self- determination before the Peace Conference and to voice Palestinian Arab fears regarding Zionism and the prospect of Jewish domination.

According to a report on the Conference filed by Captain J .N. Camp of the British Intelligence, eleven out of the twenty-seven delegates were pro-British, two pro-French, two delegates with uncertain political sympathies and the remaining twelve were pan Arab or pro -Arab. 7 2

The conference was presided over by Aref Pasha Dahudi Dajani and dominated by the notables of Palestinian towns mostly representing the propertied classes and vested political and economic interests. The most outstanding members of the Pan-Arab group were two young intellectuals belonging to the urban middle classes, 'Izzat Darwaza and Yusuf al-'Isa, editor of Falastin.

Camp reported that, from the outset, the Conference was subject to strong pressure from outside. 'The pan-Arab influence of certain members of the Muntada al-Adabi and Nadiel-Arabi was very persistent'.

The struggle inside the Conference was between the pro-British bloc and the pan-Arab bloc, and the split owed its origins to economic factors as well as to a generation gap: Young Moslems, members of the various Arab Societies agitate for an independent Palestine, which would form part of a great independent Arab State. Moslem villagers and Moslems who own any considerable amount of property are nearly all pro-British.

Camp asserted that the fear of Zionism was the main reason that leads the young pan- Arab element to favour its union with an independent Arab Syria, for with Palestine joined to an Arab Syria the people of Palestine with the help of other Arabs would be able successfully to resist Jewish immigration.73

Herein lay the dilemma of the pro-British Palestinian Arabs: although they were opposed to Zionism (the report spoke of 'the unalterable opposition of all non-Jewish elements in Palestine to Zionism'), they were actually helping the Zionist cause by being loyal to a pro-Zionist Britain. They adopted the Zionist position: namely British rule and separation of Syria and Palestine. 74

In view of this dilemma it was not surprising that Camp should have reported: I have personally heard many Arabs, both Christians and Moslems, declare that they will forcibly resist any attempt to set up in this land a Jewish State or anything resembling it. The pan-Arab young bloods, very bold in speech, say so openly ,the elderly declare that they will sell out and leave the country .1 do not think the threat of the young Arabs is to be taken lightly, as they might cause much trouble by appealing to the fanaticism of the villagers and as they certainly be supported by Arabs outside Palestine. 75

It was under the influence of the 'young bloods' that the Conference passed some strong- worded resolutions. The delegations held that resolutions expressed the wishes and

demands of the people 'Southern Syria known as Palestine'. They communicated these resolutions to the Peace Conference 'being convinced that it will admit rights, comply with our demands and grant our requests'. The Palestinians' wishes and demands submitted to the Peace Conference opened a reference to 'the fact that the Declaration of President Wilson considered to be one of the fundamental principles on which the Peace Conference is based for the freedom of nations liberated from the Turkish yoke, the cancellation of all secret treaties concluded during the war and the promise to nations to choose the kind of government they desire for themselves'.76

The decisions are worth quoting in full: 77

1 . We consider Palestine as part of Arab Syria as it has never been separated from it at any time. We are connected with it by national, religious, linguistic, natural, economic and geographic bonds.

2. The Declaration made by M. Pichon, Minister for Foreig Affairs for France, that France had rights in our country based on the desires and aspirations of the inhabitants has no foundation and we reject all the declarations made in his speech of 29th December 1918, as our wishes and aspirations are only in Arab unity and complete independence.

3. In view of the above we desire that one district Southern Syria or Palestine should not be separated from the Independent Arab Syrian Government and to be free from all foreign influence and protection.

4. In accordance with the rule laid down by President Wilson and approved by most of the Great Powers we consider that every promise or treaty concluded in respect of our country and its future as null and void and reject the same.

5. The Government of the country will apply for help to its friend Great Britain in case of need for the improvement and development of the country provided that this will not affect its independence and Arab unity in any way and will keep good relations with the Allied Powers. 7 8

The Palestine Conference also decided to send a delegation to Damascus 'to inform Arab

patriots there of the decision to call Palestine Southern Syria and unite it with Northern

Syria '.79

Another delegation of three was named 'as possible representatives to go to Paris'. 80

The decisions of the Conference were presented in writing to the British, French, Italian

and Spanish representatives in Jerusalem. It was apparent that the young elements, with

the help of Palestinian pressure from outside, prevailed on the Conference. Before

adjourning, the Conference agreed to meet again at Nablus three months hence, but failed

to elect an executive Committee to the Conference.

Camp's observations and remarks were upheld by a paper written by Weizmann based on

reports supplied by a nascent Zionist intelligence department. The paper, which was

forwarded by Sykes to the F.O., added new dimensions to the possibilities of Arab action

against Zionism:

The pro-Arabic and the absolute annexation of Palestine to the Cherif is the opinion of

the greatest intellectual and agitating part of the youth.

The moderate class of opinion belongs to the notability of the elder age are for a local

autonomy. They are much more materialistic than idealist. Though being hostile to the

Jews they do not show their hostility and will not oppose themselves to a political entente with the Jew. Youth fighting very much against them. 81

In a 'Postscriptum to the note concerning the Arab question', dated 8 January 1919, Weizmann disclosed that the Palestinian moderates, aged men, Muslims and Christians belonging to the rich and influential families of Palestine, especially of Jerusalem, had organised themselves under the name of 'Moslem and Christian Association'. This Association advocated the necessity of sending delegates to Europe who will reclaim 'Palestine for the Palestinians'. They said that it was impossible for the Christians as well as for the Jews to accept the rule of the Cheriff over Palestine as asked by the youth. 82

Britain's Weak Point

As Arab agitation against Zionism mounted, 83 the relations between the Palestinian Arabs and the British Administration became increasingly precarious. The failure of the British Government to respond to the Palestinian Arab demands for self-determination and to their appeals against Zionism was bound to lead to friction. One reason why Palestine was denied self-determination was explained in a letter from the Foreign Minister, Balfour, to the Prime Minister which no amount of Arab petitions against Zionism could alter.

The weak point of our position of course is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional, that we consider the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world importance. 84

As the Peace Conference dragged on the Palestinians became more restless as their worst fears were confirmed by Zionist public statements. Towards the end of March Clayton reported:

Anti-Zionist propaganda has increased considerably in Palestine lately and feeling is now running very high among Moslems and Christians who fear that political and economic advantages may be given to Jews in peace settlement. This feeling is increased by the rash actions and words of the Jews themselves and by pronouncements which appear by leading Zionists in the Press in England and America and elsewhere. There are considerable grounds for belief that anti-Jewish riots are being prepared in Jerusalem, Jaffa and elsewhere. Precautions are being taken but an announcement that Jews will be given any special privileges might precipitate outbreaks. 85

On the 28 March, the Muslim-Christian Committee of Jerusalem proposed to hold a demonstration on I April to protest against the Zionist Programme. When permission was denied, the Mufti and the three ex-deputies of Jerusalem acquiesced but elaborate precautionary schemes were prepared to provide against trouble in the cities and the more exposed Jewish colonies lest the more extreme Arab elements decide to act on their own. Towards the end of April the Zionist Organisation informed the Foreign Office that 'they were perturbed by the most recent advice they had had from Palestine which represented the Arabs as preparing to make trouble and as secretly arming'. 86

The Palestinian situation was aggravated by the confusion that dominated the discussions of the Paris Peace Conference on the future of the Near East. In April the Peace Conference decided to send an Inter-Allied Commission to Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia to ascertain the sentiments of the people with regard to the future administration of their affairs. The departure of the Commission was delayed because the French were "unwilling to name their members for the Commission. The British too were apprehensive lest the findings of the Commission prove detrimental to their plans and policies in Palestine.

London 's worst fears were unequivocally confirmed by the Palestine Chief dministrator's

report on the likely results of the findings of the Inter- Allied Commission, and on the

potentially explosive situation in Palestine :

In the present state of political feeling there is no doubt that if Zionism's programme is a

necessary adjunct to a mandatory the people of Palestine will select in preference the

United States or France as the mandatory , or as the protecting power of an Arab

administration .

The Palestinians desire their country for themselves and will resist any general

immigration of Jews however gradual, by every means in their power including active

hostilities. Recent events in Egypt have greatly impressed the people of Palestine.

In conclusion, the idea that Great Britain is the main upholder of the Zionist programme will preclude any local request for a British Mandate and no mandatory power can carry through Zionist programme except by force. 87

Clayton considered the report 'a true appreciation of the situation.

Fear and distrust of Zionist aims grow daily and no amount of persuasion or propaganda

will dispel it'. Furthermore, he reported that, 'There was recently a danger of serious

disturbance in which Arabs from East of Jordan were to take part'.

In accordance with the Faisal- Weizmann agreement of January 1919, 88 Faisal tried to

reconcile the Palestinian Arabs to Zionist policy.

On 11 May 1919 Clayton reported that, "Faisal has. ..informed an Arab delegation in

Damascus that he did not consider Arab and Zionist aims to be incompatible and

delegation seemed favourably impressed. Members of Zionist Commission are being

invited to visit Faisal who may also ask a few leading Palestinian Arabs to attend with a

view to rapprochment.89

It Will Have to Be Coerced

Weizmann, however, was under no illusion as to the inevitable failure of all such efforts to bring about a reconciliation with the majority of the Arabs of Palestine. 90 Nevertheless, the Zionist leader was determined to turn Palestine into a Jewish country .Alarmed by Zangwill's statement that the' Arabs ought to be removed to Syria leaving their land to the Jews of Palestine', Herbert Samuel91 remarked (in the course of a meeting of the Advisory Committee to the Palestine Office) that 'If we (Zionists) were to go to Palestine to oppress other people it would be an unspeakable disgrace'. 92 Weizmann then spoke with considerable frankness regarding the impending Inter-Allied Commission, and the unpleasant implications of a Zionist policy in Palestine:

Will the British apply self-determination in Palestine which is five hours from Egypt or not? If not it will have to be coerced. Yes or no: it amounts to that. 93 Weizmann then asked for preferential treatment and for state lands to settle 40,000 to 50,000 Jews per year. Ormsby-Gore accepted Weizmann's arguments and was in favour of granting his requests. He was in favour of encouraging non-Muslims, Europeans and Jews, to develop and stabilise the Near East in view of the fact that Islam was the main danger. Since the Zionist Organisation provided the required human element to man the Palestinian output in Europe's fight against Islam, it is in the interest of England to assist the Zionist Organisation and any other organisation which may cooperate with them in the practical development of Jewish colonisation in Palestine. 94 To Ormsby-Gore, as well as other major British political figures, Zionism and the Balfour Declaration 's policy of a Jewish national home in Palestine was a chose jugee. A week before the Inter-Allied Commission arrived the Muslirg-Christian Society of Jerusalem proposed to issue a circular regarding their views which they intended to put forward before the Commission.

The circular stressed the unity of Syria and affirmed that Palestine - southern Syria -was an inseparable part of Syria. As far as the Zionist issue was concerned, an enlightened differentiation between native Jews and foreign incoming Zionists were made.

We completely refuse to allow Palestine to be turned into a national home for the Jews. We also do not admit any Jewish immigrant into our country and energetically protest against the Zionist movement.

The native Jews who are previous inhabitants of the country, should be considered as native and possess privileges and misfortunes as we do 95

General Allenby, however, considered the circular undesirable and withheld permission to issue.

For reasons which go beyond the scope of the present study, the French and the British failed to participate in the Inter-Allied Commission.

Eventually, it was decided that the American members of the Commission should proceed and make the necessary investigations on their own. The implications of the absence of the other powers that were to participate in the Commission could not have failed to leave an adverse reaction among the Arabs, but Clayton could have been right when he informed the FO that: It is conceivable that the leaders of the people may feel themselves more free to express their real feelings being unembarrassed by any fear of offending either Great Britain or France, both of whom are considered to be interested parties.96

The King Crane Commission

In his meticulous study97 on the Inter-Allied Commission, known later as the King Crane Commission after the two American Commissioners, Harry Howard delved very deeply into the formation and findings of the American investigators, and there is no need to go over the same ground again. The Commission arrived on 19 June and lost no time in ascertaining the opinions and desires of the whole people. Before they left Palestine the Commission heard evidence and received petitions from all kinds of political groups in

the country .98

Summarising their findings the Commission reported:

Judging from the evidence which had been presented to the Commission during its short

visit to Palestine, June 10-25, only the Zionist Jews, about one-tenth of the total

population favoured the establishment of a Jewish National home in that country .The

rest of the population Moslem and Christian Arabs alike, desired to preserve the unity of

the country with Syria of which they considered Palestine to be both historically and

geographically a part. 99

The Moslem and Christian population were practically unanimous against Zionism,

usually expressing themselves with great emphasis. 100

The Commission also noted that

The feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent -1350 -in all -of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests -those for a united Syria and for independence - had a larger support. 101

Before the Commission left Palestine they began to hear consistently about a forthcoming congress in Damascus. 'For the first time the Arab delegations were sounding the note that the problem of a mandatory power should be left to conference shortly to assemble in Damascus' .102

The change from the insistence on independence to the acquiescence in a mandatory system was a significant one. Colonel Cornwallis, Deputy Political Officer at Damascus, attributed this change to: A letter received from Rustum Bey Haidar, the Arab representative in Paris, saying that it will be fatal to ask for complete independence, as the Powers have decided that there must be a mandate. 103

Cornwallis further reported that Faisal had by that time dissolved both Hizb al-Istiqlal

(The Independence Party) and al-Ittihad as-Suri (The Syrian Union) and had announced

that there will be no more political societies in OET East. However, the Hashemite Prince

began to realise the difficulties which he will have in reconciling the Palestinians and

Zionists, and no longer treats the question as a minor one.

Meanwhile Palestinians here are vehement, and Mohamed-es-Saleh-al-Husseini of

Nablus has been advocating the defence of Arab independence in Palestine by the

sword. 104

The Palestinians did not share Faisal's tendency to bow before the powers and their

political schemes. According to Clayton the opposite was true. 105

The General Syrian Congress

The General Syrian Congress finally held its meetings in Damascus during the first week of July, comprising representatives from the three zones viz. the Southern, Eastern and Western, provided with credentials and authority by the inhabitants of our various districts, Moslems, Christians and Jews. 106

A delegation chosen by the Congress presented to the Commission a statement signed by the members of the Congress, known as the Damascus Programme, which called for

'immediate complete independence for Syria without protection or tutelage, under a civil constitutional monarchy'. As far as Palestine was concerned, the Damascus Programme voiced Palestinian feelings in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of their statement.

7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria known as Palestine and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country, for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical and political point of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.

8. We demand that there shall be no separation of the southern part of Syria known as Palestine. ..from the Syrian country, and desire the unity of the country to be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.

10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country, and against any private engagement aiming at establishing Zionism in the Southern part of Syria, thus we demand the annulment of these conventions and agreements absolutely .107

The Palestinian members of the Congress, who came from all the major towns of Palestine, played a conspicuous part in it and 'Izat Darwaza was its secretary. A report on the political situation by Colonel French, Chief Political Officer, EEF, in the wake of the departure of the King Crane commission stated: the whole country is now quiet from a political point of view, but it is the quiet resulting from exhaustion, which followed the political orgy during the visit of the Commission, and partly from the tension caused by the belief that the decision of the Conference will be known shortly. 108

In the same letter French replied to an allegation made by Weizmann regarding 'artificial agitation' in Palestine: It is the considered opinion of British officers who know Palestine well that the opposition to Zionism, which is based to a certain extent on the national sentiment of the inhabitants, has grown stronger during the past months, and it is believed that is well known to the (Zionist) Commission, which has an efficient 'intelligence' service.

Colonel French 's report was, in fact, a subdued version of what one of his staff at Haifa had to say about Weizmann 's allegations:

The striking miscalculation of Weizmann's as to the general opposition to Zionism which he characterizes as 'artificial agitation that may still be prevalent' is startling. I found at Jerusalem the opposition still more strong than when I left there 4 months ago, and better organized, it is generally recognised that Jerusalem and Nablus are the political touchstones for Palestine, the latter place being if anything more fanatical and anti-Jew than Jerusalem. The Zionist Commission has in Jerusalem a very efficient counter- espionage service, and I suggest that their reports have either been sent home or ignored as alarmist. 109

Preparing for Revolt

The Zionist Intelligence records of that period, The Hagana Archives, corroborate what British Intelligence Officers in Palestine were reporting to their superiors in Cairo and London. Before we deal with the interesting and detailed reports of the Zionist Intelligence, it is necessary to refer to a highly informative report by Major Camp about the 'Arab Movement and Zionism'. 110

The report gave an account of the leading Arab societies in Jerusalem: el-Muntada el- Adabi, el-Nadi el-Arabi, el-Akha we 'I Afaf; Muntada el-Dajjani and el-Feda 'iyyeh, the latter being a secret commando type body comprising many policemen and gendarmes.

The activities of these societies involved a comprehensive preparation for a revolt: Arming of members with small arms; preparation of lists of prominent Jews and pro- Zionists among non-Jews, with place of residence of each; propaganda among the Bedouin of the trans-Jordan. Effort to concentrate Palestinian officers at Amman, so as to be ready in case pro-Zionist policy is announced, learning of Hebrew by a few agents so as to follow Hebrew papers and conversation; appointment of agents to watch everything going on; effort to effect agreement with police and gendarmes to hand over arms or at least to put no obstacles in the way in case a revolt takes place; teaching of pan-Arab ideals to children, especially those in Reshidieh and Rawdte el-Maarif Schools. The activities of three of these societies were described earlier in Weizmann's 8 February report. According to that report members of these societies were to try also to organise terrorists and secret corporations to fight later against the Jews by guerrillas. They try generally to create an 'etat d'esprit' very hostile against us. Many of them engage themselves in the Police service so that they might do much easier their work. Many of them are quite learned young men, having studied in Europe and several of them know perfectly well the Jewish question. 1 1 1

An undercover agent of the Zionist Intelligence reported a meeting of sixteen members of el-Feda 'iyyeh on 27 August 1919, presumably in preparation for a revolt. Members reported on successful contacts with the chiefs of Trans-Jordan, the availability of arms, and on all the villagers around Jerusalem who 'wait impatiently for the first signal'. 1 12 A speech delivered at that meeting by one of the leaders of the secret commando organisation Jawdat el-Halabi illustrated the radical character of the el-Feda'iyyeh and the readiness of its members to draw the logical conclusions against the Anglo-Zionist alliance in Palestine:

We purchase arms as much as we liked and we shall receive more. Our principal action must be against the Jews who want to take our land, but if the Government will help them we shall also be against the Government. Many of our members and friends are policemen and gendarmes and that is very good for our future. We must all know the martyrs of the Fatherland and our honour. 1 13

The youth of this country are not afraid of anybody even the autocratic Government. They want to begin already and they will all receive death gladly. Most of them ask me always when we are going to rise against the unbelievers and know our strength and get rid of them once and for all. 115 The antagonism to Zionism of the majority of the population is deep-rooted -it is fast

leading to hatred of the British -and will result, if the Zionist programme is forced upon them, in an outbreak of a very serious character necessitating the employment of a much larger number of troops than at present located in the territory .116

From the available intelligence reports, British and Zionist, it was apparent that the peasants were more prone to action and to revolt entailing self-sacrifice than other groups of society. This was, in some instances, attributed to religious fanaticism. In addition to this relevant element, there were economic reasons for peasant resentment of Zionist schemes and ambitions: the boycott of Arab labour in Jewish colonies and Jewish enterprise, the prospect of being uprooted as the Zionists acquired more lands, and finally Zionist opposition to the Agricultural Loans Scheme. 1 17

According to the report of the Court of Inquiry which investigated the circumstances that led to the disturbances of April 1920:

The incident of the veto on the Agricultural Loans, however, had a far greater effect in inflaming the growing irritation of the population against the Zionists. ..The people at once came to the conclusion that the Zionists had interfered in order that they should be left in great straits and should ultimately have to sell their lands to the Zionists at any price.118

During September British Naval Intelligence reported that anti-Zionist feeling was becoming increasingly bitter and that 'a plot has been discovered by us by which it was proposed to assassinate Dr. Weizmann on his arrival'. 119

On announcing the separation of Palestine from Syria towards the end of September vehement protests were voiced in Jerusalem's Suriyya al-Janubiyya (Southern Syria), which was owned and edited by Aref al-Aref, and in the Damascus press. The announcement inspired an article by 'Izzat Darwaza in al-Urdun (The Jordan), published in Damascus, appropriately entitled 'Now is the Time to Act':

It is not for the representatives of English, French and Zionist affairs to do as they please with a country which has been liberated by the blood of its children, who are ready to shed more blood if necessary to attain their ends. 120

Another Naval Intelligence report noted that by November 1919 the whole anti-Zionist movement in Palestine had taken a very anti- British turn. Four weeks later Naval Intelligence reported that anti-Zionist propaganda was spreading to small villages where the fellaheen are interested listeners when local and Damascus papers are read out to them.

The possibility of active opposition to the Jews is being discussed. There are indications that a definite demonstration against the Zionists will be attempted, and an undoubted air of expectancy exists. 121

By early 1920 it was evident to all parties in Palestine that an anti-zionist outburst was imminent. In January British Naval Intelligence reported that emisaries from Damascus were frequently proceeding to Jaffa.

These hasty visits are thought to foreshadow an attempt at simultaneous disturbances throughout Syria and Palestine on the lines of those organised in Egypt. 122

The report further asserted that anti-Zionism was responsible for a decided rapprochment between Christians and Muslims. As for the fellahin, they allege that the Jewish colonists are subsidised from without and have been granted privileges by the Administration which were denied to others, and state that they cannot compete against such advantages, and would therefore be ultimately squeezed out of existence.

By February the process of polarisation had been accomplished. In a letter to Curzon, Weizmann pointed out that 'there is no doubt that anti-Zionist and anti-British propaganda amongst the Arabs run parallel'. 123

On 27 February 1920 a big Arab political demonstration was held in Jerusalem with the knowledge of the authorities. Despite Zionist protestations, General Bols, the Chief Administrator, took the view that organised processions could be controlled and that they acted as a safety valve. 124

A second demonstration was held on 8 March amidst considerable excitement owing to the recent proclamation of Prince Faisal King of Syria and Palestine.

The speeches were of violently political characters... There was an incident said to have been caused by a Jewish boy trying to force his way through the processes. This started a quarrel and there was some stone throwing. A few Jews were injured but the police quickly regained control and the demonstration dispersed without further accident. 125

On 1 March two Jewish settlements at Metulla and Tel Hai near the Syrian border were

attacked by armed Palestinian bands 126 probably organised by the Palestinians in

Damascusl27.

Captain Joseph Trumpledor, a prominent Zionist soldier, and six other Jews were killed

during the raid. The incident which was indicative of the Palestinian political mood, and a

glimpse of coming events, failed to spark a general anti-Zionist uprising owing to the

deteriorating political situation and the imminent collapse of the Arab regime in

Damascus.

Describing the situation in Palestine on the eve of Easter 1920, the Palin Commission

Report stated:

The whole native population Arab and Christian, was in a condition of active hostility at

once to the Zionists and the British Administration, their sentiment influenced by a sense

of their own wrongs, their fears for the future, and the active propaganda of various anti

British and anti-Zionist elements working freely in their midst.

The signs and warnings had not escaped either the Zionists or the Administration. 128

The Spark

On II March as a result of Zionist pressure brought to bear on the Chief Administrator, demonstrations were prohibited, a measure which must have added to the already widespread Arab resentment. The approach of Easter week with its inevitable religious disorders and the coincidence of the Christian and Jewish festivals with the Muslim Nebi Musa Pilgrimage caused serious anxiety to the Jewish Community and the Administration. On that occasion Muslim pilgrims assembled bearing their local banners from the surrounding villages at Jerusalem. The Pilgrimage had always been officially recognised by the Government who used to

provide the necessary troops and a band in honour of the ceremony. In view of the political excitement and the prevailing tension, it was not surprising that Palestinian Arab nationalist circles were determined to turn any Arab gathering into an occasion for protest and agitation against Zionism and the Administration. Thus, when the Hebron pilgrims arrived on 4 April, their procession was halted more than once, to hear speeches by Aref al-Aref, Musa Kazem, the Mayor, Hajj Arnin al-Husseini and other prominent Muslims. The Palin Commission report stated that the practice of delaying the procession to hear speeches was first introduced in 1919. In 1920, however, the speeches were of a flagrantly political character culminating in the exhibition of the portrait of the Emir Faisal, who was greeted as 'King of Syria and Palestine'. The crowd at this point was gradually worked up into a high inflammatory condition and it seems extremely probable that there were agents provocateurs intermingled with them here awaiting their opportunity .129 According to Darwaza, anti-Zionist and anti-British slogans were shouted in the procession. 130 'Isa as-Sifri, a Palestinian Christian, recorded that the Palestinian Christians participated in the procession calling for Arab unity and independence and declaring their opposition to Zionist immigration .131

After hearing the speeches and as the procession was passing through the Jaffa Gate, an explosion occurred:

The exact incident which caused the explosion has not been clearly ascertained , possibly there were more than one there is some evidence to show that the attitude of the Jewish spectators was in certain cases provocative, but it appears much more likely that the mine was deliberately fired by some agents provocateurs raising the cry of an insult to the banner by a Jew. It is quite evident, however, that in the excited condition to which the pilgrims round the Nadi el-Araby Club had been wrought by the speeches of the political orators and the exhibition of Emir Feisal's portrait, the most trivial incident would be sufficient to cause an outbreak. 132

The explosion led to stone-throwing at the shops in the vicinity of the incident. Several Jews were also beaten and at least one stabbed.

The crowd then passed down into the city looting Jewish shops and assaulting Jews. 'There is some evidence to show that a few of the Jews were armed and occasionally retaliated by firing on the mob'.J33

The outbreak lasted sporadically from 4 to 10 April. Fighting and looting took place despite the declaration of Martial Law. This was partly due to the narrow alleys of the old city of Jerusalem as well as to the state of exasperation and excitement prevalent among the Arabs at that time. The total casualties reported amounted to 251, of which 9 died, 22 were seriously wounded and 220 slightly wounded. Of these casualties, the Jews sustained 5 killed, 18 seriously wounded and 193 slightly wounded, most of which resulted from Arab attacks with knives, sticks and stones. Seven British soldiers were reported wounded -all apparently at the hands of the Arab mob. The Arabs sustained 28 casualties,4 of which were killed by firearms. The Court suspected that 'a number of fellahin suffering from slight wounds may have escaped to the country'. From all the evidence available the Court concluded that 'the attack was entirely against the Jews'. Nevertheless, the Court admitted that, in Palestine, the British were faced with a native population thoroughly exaperated by a sense of injustice and disappointed hopes,

panic stricken as to their future and as to ninety per cent of their numbers in consequence bitterly hostile to the British ministration. 134

Before coming to the Court's conclusions, two phenomena stand out in the report under discussion relevant to the Anglo-Zionist convergence in Palestine and the nature of Arab opposition to that alliance during the disturbances of 1920. The first was the emergence of Jewish 'Self-defence' units, the Hagana, raised by V. Jabotinsky, who served as a lieutenant in the British Army during the War, and Mr Rutenberg, who was a prominent Russian official under Kerensky (1917). The Court's report stated that these units were raised without the Administration's approval or knowledge, but nevertheless 'were openly drilling at the back of Lemel School and on Mount Scopus', 135 a fact that was familiar to the Arabs during the month of March. Of greater significance was the Administration's decision to use the illegal Jewish units. 136

The other phenomenon was the divergence of views between the Zionist leaders and some British officials, including the members of the Court, as to the real causes of Arab unrest in Palestine.

It has been said by the Zionists that the popular excitement is purely artificial and largely the result of propaganda by the effendi class, which fears to lose its position owing to Jewish competition. It is sufficient to quote the evidence of Major Waggett with which the Court finds itself in full accord, when he says: 'It is very important to realise that the opposition is by no means superficial or manufactured, and I consider this a dangerous view to take of the situation .137

In their final conclusions the members of the Court pointed out that 'The Administration

was considerably hampered in its policy by the direct interference of the Home

Authorities'.

They also found it necessary to warn that 'the situation at present obtaining in Palestine is

exceedingly dangerous and demands firm and patient handling if a serious catastrophe is

to be avoided'. 138

Various prison sentences were passed against twenty-three individuals for complicity in

the Jerusalem disturbances 139

The Easter troubles brought to a head the question of the Mayoralty of Jerusalem; Musa

Kazem was dismissed because of his participation in the demonstration against Zionist

policies. Musa Kazern inforced Storrs that under these circumstances no Arab will dare

take my place 140 As it turned out, a rival notable Ragheb Bey Nashashibi accepted the

post the moment it was offered to him, thus demonstrating a lack of solidarity and

resolution among the notables vis-a-vis the British Administration.

The Palin Commission Report was suppressed and until recently (1968) treated confidentially. Violent Arab opposition failed to introduce any fundamental changes in the overall British policy in Palestine. Quite the contrary , His Majesty's Government were contemplating a switch from military administration to civil Mandatory Government incorporating in its provisions the Balfour Declaration, despite the delay in concluding the peace treaty with Turkey. Moreover , the British Government proposed to

appoint Herbert Samuel, a well-known Jewish politician, as the first British High Commissioner in Palestine. 141 The risks involved in appointing a well-known Zionist Jew were promptly pointed out by the British Authorities in the area. Both Samuel and the Cabinet were well aware of the nature of these risks. In a letter to Lord Curzon, Samuel reported the gist of a conversation with a deputation from the Council of Jews of Jerusalem:

I told them that the Government had received a grave warning. .. that the appointment of any Jew as the first Governor of Palestine would likely to the signal for an outbreak of serious disorder, that there was a danger of widespread attacks upon the Jewish colonies and upon individual Jews; that raids might take place across the border; and further, that important Christian elements in the population, whose co-operation was necessary for the effective conduct of the Government, might withdraw their support. It had been represented that Mohammedan opinion was already in an excitable state, owing to the inclusion of the Balfour Decclaration in the Turkish Treaty, and that such an appointment would be regarded as the transfer of the whole country to the Jews. 142

In his published memoirs, Samuel contended that he had been appointed 'With full knowledge on the part of His Majesty's Government of my Zionist sympathies, and no doubt largely because of them'. 143

On 31 May following the announcement of the Palestine Mandate, the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in its articles, and the appoint-ment of Samuel as the first High Commissioner for Palestine, a number of leading Palestinian political personalities met at the Nadi-al- 'Arabi in Damascus where they resolved to form 'The Palestinian Arab Society'. The officers of the Society were Haj Amin Husseini, Tzzat Darwaza and Aref al- Aref. The society urged all Palestinian societies and clubs to work together for the common good. Moreover, the Society protested against the San Remo Conference's decision to grant Britain a mandate over Palestine and against Samuel's appointment. It also appealed to the Muslims of India and to the Pope, drawing attention to the Jewish danger in Palestine 144

The appointment of Samuel came as a severe blow to the Palestinian Arab masses, who, nevertheless, seemed determined to resist Zionism and the Balfour Declaration as their struggle against them entered a new stage.

Notes

1 . Memorandum of the Jewish Palestinian Qeuestion, Arab Bureau, 5 February 917, FO 822/14, p. 16.

2. He played an important role in Palestinian affairs later on when he assumed the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies.

3. Ormsby Gore, 'Palestine Political', 12 January 1917, FO 822/14.

4. See Antonius, p. 187. Also see Al-Thawra al-Arabiyya al-Kubra" (The Great Arab Revolt), Mulhaq al-Hayat, Beirut, 22 November 1966, p.41.

5. For the Hussein-McMahon correspondence see Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, July 1916 -March 1917,Cmd. 5957 (Miscellaneous No. 3) 1939, HMSO London. 6. For an early confidential discussion of the subject asserting the inclusion of Palestine in the proposed Arab state see Memorandum

on British Commitments to King Hussein, Political Intelligence Department, 5 November 1918, FO 371/3384. For other documents written at the time the McMahon pledge was given, see McMahon to FO, 26 October 1915, FO 371/2486. Also see Grey to Buchanan, 30 November 1915, FO 371/2767. Also see Grey to McMahon 20 October 1915, FO 371/6237 and FO 141/461.

7. See FO 371/4368. The text of the Agreement also appears in E.L. Woodward and R. Butler (eds.) Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. 1st ser., vol. IV, p. 241-51.

8. The original letter deposited by Lord Rothschild in the British Museum: addl.

Ms,41 178 folios 1 and 3 for a reproduction of the letter and a full discussion of the efforts and negotiations leading to the Declaration, see Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, London 1961, passim ; J.M.N. Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality, London, 1939, pp. 88-186 passim; and Chaim Weizman, Trial and Error, London 1950, pp. 223-52, passim.

9. As early as March 1916 Sir Mark Sykes of the FO reported that: 'When in Cairo Dr Feris Nimr and (Major) Faruki, poles asunder on the political question, both told me that Arabs, Christians and Moslems alike would fight in the matter to the last man against Jewish Dominion in Palestine'. See Sykes to Buchanan, 14 March 1916, F0371/2767.

10. MacDonogh to Clayton, 21 November 1916, FO 882/14.

11. HMSO, Palestine Royal Commission Report Cmd. 5479 of 1937 (London,1937 edition), p. 153. Hereafter referred to as the Peel Commission Report. Also see Colonel A. P. Waved, The Palestine

Campaigns (London, 1928), p. 13; Jeffries, op.cit., pp.210-ll;and T.E. Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert, London, 1927 p.208.

12. Deedes to H.Cr. of Egypt, 16 December 1917, FO 141/803. Also see Clayton to FO December 1917, FO 141/803.

13. Deedes to General Headquarters, EEF, 19 December 1917,FO 141/803.

14. Clayton to FO, 30 December 1917, FO 141/803.

15. Clayton to Sykes, 15 December 1917, Clayton Papers, Durham University, 147/1.

16. Sir Mark Sykes,The Palestine and West Arabian Situation', War Cabinet, 1 January 1918, FO 371/3388.

17.1bid.

18. Between December 1917, and the summer of 1920, Palestine was governed according to the rules of military administration of occupied enemy territoy. This meant that the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) was bound by military law to preserve the status quo, to avoid the introduction of marked change in the laws of the country or their manner of application and to carry on with the least

disturbance of public life pending the appointment of a permanent government. The Administration in Palestine was a military organisation acting under a chief Administrator who received his orders from the Commander-in-Chief (General Allenby) through the General Officer Commanding. There were thirteen Military Governors of Districts, reduced in 1919 to ten, with fifty-nine military officers as assistants. See Peel Commission Report, op.cit., pp.1534.

19. Ronald Storrs, Orientations, London, 1937, p.35L

20. A letter from Mr Joseph Cohen, The Times, 19 September 1919; and Weizmann op.cit., p. 305.

21. Weizmann to Eder, 17 December 1918, FO 371/4170.

22. 'Note on the Interview with Mr. Balfour, 4 December 1918, F0371/3385.

23. FO to Wingate, 4 January 1918, FO 371/3054. Also see Commander Hogarth's interview with King Hussein, 15 January 1918, FO 371/3383.

24. Clayton to FO, 25 February 1918, FO 371/3391. For manifestations of anti- Zionism among Arabs outside Palestine see same to same, 5 March 1918, FO 371/3391.

25. FO to Wingate, 13 February 1918, Durham 148/5, No.218.

26. Clayton to FO, 10 March 1918, FO 371/3391.

27. Clayton was not altogether happy at the complete identification of Britain with the Zionist aims and hoped that the Zionist Commission would rectify the situation. See same to same, 14 March 1918, F0371/3391.

28. Clayton to FO, 30 March 1918, FO 371/3391.

29. Clayton to Sykes, 31 March 1918, FO 371/3383.

30. Weizman, op.cit., p. 272.

31. Clayton to FO, 9 April 1918, FO 371/3391.

32. Ormsby Gore to Balfour, 19 April 1918, FO 371/3395.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. The Palestine News, 25 April 1918, British Museum, author's translation.

36. Weizmann to Ormsby Gore, 16 April 1918, FO 371/3398.

37. Storrs to OETA, GHQ, 22 April 1918, FO 371/3398. Clayton too found it necessary to sound a vote of caution to Sykes, see Clayton to Sykes, 18 April 1918, Durham 148/8.

38. See 22 April 1918, FO 371/3398.

39. A letter from Weizmann to Brandeis, 25 April 1918, FO 371/3395. 40.'Future of Palestine', May 1918, FO 371/3383.

41.Weizmann to Balfour, 30 May 1918, FO 371/3395.

42. Ibid, Clayton was the one who encouraged Weizmann to befriend the Hashemites. See 13 June 1918, Durham 148/10.

43. P.C. Joyce, interview between Dr Weizmann and Sharif Faisal', 5 June 1918, FO 883/14.

44. 27 August 1918, FO 271/3389, Annex 2.

45. Clayton to Wingate, 2 August 1918, Durham 149/3.

46. Albina to Sykes, n.d., FO 800/221.

47. The Palestine News, 27 June i918.

48. Clayton to FO, 31 Augustl918, FO 371/3395.

49. See 1 October 1918, FO 371/3395.

50. Clayton to Balfour, 16 June 1918, FO 371/3395. It is not unlikely that Ormsby-Gore included agricultural workers in the categcry of Arab labour'.

52. Clayton to FO 17 July 1918, FO 371/3391. 53.27 August 1918, FO 371/3389.

54. 'Report of the Arab Movement', Arab Bureau, Cairo, July 1918, FO 882/3391.

55. Clayton to FO, 25 August 1918, FO 371/3391.

56. Colonel T .E. Lawrence saw Zionist ambitions in Palestine as a counter to the Sykes- Picot agreement and a way of 'hiffing' the French out of the Middle East' and it was not surprising that the French were willing to condone Arab anti:- Zionist articles in 1918. See Philip Knightly and Colin Simpson, The Secret Lives

of Lawrence of Arabia, London, 1969, p. 102.

57. Sykes to Picot, 7 September 1918, FO 371/3388.

58. See Clayton to Wingate, 21 September 1918, Durham 148/8.

59. Amery, L.S. "fhe Future of Palestine', 18 October 1918, FO 371/3384.

60. "The Strategic Importance of Syria to the British Empire ': General Staff, War Office, 9 December 1918, FO 371/4178.

61. Clayton to Foreign secretary, 8 November 1918, FO 371/3385. Also see 4 November 1919FO141/803.

62. Ibid.

63. Clayton to FO,19 November 1918, FO 371/3395. The Anglo-French Declaration referred to is that of November 1918, addressed to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which was instrumental in fostering the rising hopes for freedom and independence: 'The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting the War in the East. ..is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations'. See 25 March 1919, FO 371/4179; also see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 5974 of 1939, p.51 and Jacob Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle Bast, vol.11, Princeton 1958 (first published 1956), p.30.

64.16 November 1918, FO 371/3386.

65. See Hubbard to H.Q.,OETA South, 20 November 1918, FO 371/3386.

66.15 November 1919, FO 371/3386.

67. Storrs to OETA South, HQ,19 November 1918, FO 371/3386.

68. The Muslim Arabs consistently backed the struggle of the Christian Orthodox Arabs against the Greek hierarchy in their Church. Storrs thought that 'this solidarity has been very greatly increased by the menace of Zionism'. See Storrs to HQ, OET A South, 16 November 1918, FO 371/3386.

69. Same to same, 24 November 1918, FO 371/3386.

70. Ibid

71. The Palestine News, 6 February 1919.

72. J.N. Camp, 'The Palestine Conference', 15 February 1919, FO 371/4153.

73. Ibid., p.3.

74. See 5 February 1919, FO 371/4153.

75. Camp, op.cit.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. According to Darwaza the delegation was prevented from proceeding to Damascus by the British authorities. See Tzzat Darwaza, al-Qadiyya al-Falastiniyya (The Palestinian Question) (Saida, 1959), p.36.

81. A report by Weizmann, 8 February 1919, FO 371/4170.

82. Ibid. The Catholics, however, were in favour of a united Syria on account of their anti-Zionist leanings as well as their pro-French sympathies. See 18 March 1919, FO 371/4180.

83. The presence of three Jewish battalions Royal Fusiliers (British Army) augmented Arab unrest; a complete llle on the history , formation and record of these units is available at the Public Record office, War Office, 32/1539.

84. 19 February 1919, FO 371/4179.

85. Clayton to FO, 26 March 1919, FO 371/4153.

86. See 30 April 1919, FO 371/4180. 87.2 May 1919, FO 371/4180.

88. For the text of the Agreement and Faisal's hand-written reservation see St Anthony's Private Papers, Middle East Library , Oxford; and Weizmann, op.cit., pp. 308-9.

89. Clayton to FO, II May 1919, FO 371/4180.

90. See Weizrnann to Aaron and Felix, 8 May 1919, FO 371/4181.

91. A prominent British Zionist who had assumed the post of Home Secretary and who later became First High Commissioner in Palestine.

92.10 May 1919,CZA Z/16009.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Clayton to FO, 2 May 1919, FO 371/4181.

96. Ibid.

97. See Harry Howard, The King Crane Commission, Beirut, 1963, pp. 9-34 passim.

98. In Palestine itself 260 petitions in all were submitted and out of these 222 (85.3 per cent) declared against the Zionist programme. This was the largest percentage in the district of anyone point. For some of the original Arabic petitions see King Papers, Oberlin College Library, Oberlin, Ohio.

99. Howard, op.cit., p.IOO.

100. Ibid., p.102.

101. Charles R. Crane and Henry C. King, Report of the American Section of the Inter- Allied Commission of Mandates in Turkey, Section One, Report upon Syria, Paris, 28 August 1919, National Archives, Department of State, 181.9102/9, hereafter referred to as the Syrian Report. Also see Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919, US Government Printing Office, 1947. Also see Howard, op.cit., pp. 345-56.

101. Howard, op.cit., p. 98.

103. Clayton to Curzon, Enclosure no.l, 5 Jurle 1919, FO 371/4181.

104. Ibid.

105. Clayton to Foreign Secretary , 19 June 1919, FO 371/4181. Polarisation: The Military Administration 1917-1920

106. Memorandum of the General Syrian Congress to the American Section of the Inter- Allied Commission, 3 July 1919, FO 371/4182.

107.1bid.

108. French to Curzon, 30 August 1919, FO 371/4182.

109.12 August 1919.FO 371/4226.

110. Camp to CPO, GHQ, Cairo, 12 August 1919, FO 371/4182.

111. Weizmann, op.cit., 8 February 1919. These societies were el-Muntada el-Arabi, el- Nadi el Arabi and el-Akha we'I-Afaf.

112. Hag ana Archives, Jerusalem, 27 August 1919.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid., 2 September 1919.

115. Ibid.

116. Watson to CPO, EEF, 16 August 1919, FO 371/4171.

117. The Scheme would have provided much-needed loans for the Arab farmers.

For Zionist objections against the scheme see Weizmann to Sir Ronald Graham, 14 July 1919, FO 371/4225.

118. 'Report of the Court of Inquiry convened by order of H.E. The High Commissioner and Commander-ln. Chief dated the 12th Day of April 1920', 1 July 1920, FO 371/5121, hereafter referred to as the Palin Commission Report.

119. 'Zionism', Naval Intelligence, 19 September 1919, FO 371/4238. 120.18 October 1919, FO 371/4185.

121. 'Situation in Syria and Palestine', Naval Intelligence, 12 December 1919, FO

371/4238.

122 'Situation in Syria and Palestine', Naval Intelligence, 9 January 1920, F0371/4238.

123.7 February 1920, FO 371/4181.

124. Palin Commission Report, op.cit., p. 56.

125. Ibid., p.57 .

126. See Weizmann, op.cit., pp. 317-18; Christopher Sylces, Crossroads to Israel, London, 1965, p.21.

127. see Darwaza, op.cit., p. 37 .

128. Palin Commission Report, op.cit., p. 53.

129. Ibid., p.62.

130. Darwaza, op.cit., p. 37 .

131. Tsa Sifri, Falastin al-'Arabiyya bayn al-Intidab wa 1-Sahyuniyya, Jerusalem, 1937,p.47.

132. Palin Commission Report, op.cit., pp. 63-4.

133. Ibid., p.65.

134. Ibid., pp.75-8.

135. Ibid., p.68.

136. Ibid., p.70. 137.1bid.,p.79.

138. Ibid., pp.81-2.

139. Long prison sentences were passed against' Aref al-' Aref and Haj Amin Husseini, but both were able to escape to Trans -Jordan.

140. Storrs, op.cit., p. 391.

141. See Elie Kedourie, 'Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine', Middle Eastern Studies, vol.V, no.l, January 1969.

142. A letter from Herbert Samuel to Lord Cunon, 14 May 1920, FO 800/156.

143. Herbert Samuel, Memoirs, London, 1945, p. 168.

144. Sifri, op.cit., pp.34-5.

Chapter 4

DEADLOCK: 1920-1923

The Jerusalem outbreak of April 1920 attracted the attention of the San Remo Conference to the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine. Far from bringing about a review of Britain's JNH policies, the Conference nominated Great Britain as Mandatory in Palestine whose duties were defined by a verbatim repetition of the Balfour Declaration.

It was not until April 1920 (three days after the Mandate nomination), that the Declaration itself was officially disclosed by the Military Administration to the people of Palestine. (1) Five days later, the San Remo decisions were announced to the notables of Nablus. Despite Allenby's grave warnings (2) and despite legal considerations arising from the delay in the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet approved a Zionist suggestion that Herbert Samuel be the first High Commissioner in Palestine (3).

Between the San Remo nomination in April 1920 and September 1923 when the Palestine Mandate was brought into full operation, the respective attitudes of the three parties to the Palestine problem hardened and crystallised. The Mandate provisions transferred the British Zionist accord, as embodied in the Balfour Declaration, from a love affair built on mutual interest into an internationally sanctioned Catholic marriage, where Britain was committed to a JNH policy in return for Zionist cooperation and backing in Palestine.

Following the official announcement of the Balfour Declaration and the San Remo decision, a wave of Palestinian Arab protests against these policies and against the separation of Palestine from Syria swept Palestine (4) and manifestations of anxiety and restiveness abounded. Several major clashes between Arab tribes and the British garrisons along the Beisan-Samakh frontier with Syria took place, where heavy casualties on both sides were inflicted.

On 6 May Fata al-Arab of Damascus, reported that 'Muslims and Christians are convening more political meetings, which may result in protestations against the British policy that helped divide Syria'.

Four days later al-Karmal reported that 'delegates were sent to Galilee and Acre to urge the inhabitants to assist in the Jerusalem Conference'.

Indignant as the Palestinians were at British pro-Zionist policies, the Palestinian political notability sought with energy and determination to avoid a head-on collision with the British authorities in the course of the fight against Zionism. The Palestinian leadership aimed at bringing about a change of British policy (in Palestine) through a show of (peaceful) determination and friendly persuasion.

In an article on the composition and purpose of the proposed Congress, al-Karmal reflected the prevalent strategy of the Muslim-Christian Associations' leadership vis-a-vis the, Anglo-Zionist convergence in Palestine. 'The British Government is strong and therefore it is difficult to fight it. We must confine our revolt against our opponents'. (5)

Conciliatory gestures notwithstanding, the British authorities prohibited the convention of the Palestine Second Congress for security reasons.

A minority of the political notability went to the length of co-operating with the Zionists. In accordance with a secret Zionist programme drawn up by Weizmann, (6) Dr. Eder of

the Zionist Commission concluded a deal with the editor of al-Akhbar for £P 125. He also concluded deals for larger sums of money with Sa'id Bey Nablusi and Rashid Abu Khadra of Jaffa and Haidar Bey Tuqan of Nablus. This particular Zionist drive failed and Palestinian protests against the collaborators were reported by Eder's liaison officer.' It was this episode that prompted al-Karmal's call on 14 May 1920, for national unity 'in order to influence public opinion to see that landowners do not sell their land to the Jews'.

The announcement of Samuel's appointment as High Commissioner came as a severe shock to the Palestinians. Following a comprehensive tour in May, General Bols recorded: They are convinced that he will be a partisan Zionist and that he represents a Jewish and not British Government. (8)

In the same report Bols spoke of 'definite signs of Bolshevik propaganda and ideas', however, neither the Poale Zion (Workers of Zion) nor the Socialist Workers' Party (Communist Party) had any great following among the Arab proletariat workers and peasants. A pamphlet by the Poale Zion accused the Zionist leaders of 'poisoning the soul of the Jewish workers against the uncultured fellah and of waging economic war against those who have nothing'. (9) The Socialist Workers' Party 'remained exclusively Jewish up to late 1920 and the Communists had great difficulty in finding, not only Arab candidates for party membership but even sympathisers and potential allies', (10)

As the date for the introduction of civil government drew nearer, Palestinian Arab protests against the Sam Remo decisions and the appointment of Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner became more vehement. Faisal begged Allenby to urge the British Government 'to reverse a decision which vitally affects both interests and amour propre of Arab population'. (11)

Opposition to Samuel's appointment was not confined to diplomatic notes: 'rumours of intended Arab raids on June 30th, with intention of impressing Sir Herbert Samuel. Further reports that attempts to assassinate him are intended '.(12) The Zionists gave information regarding an alleged impending outbreak at the end of Ramadan.(13) When Samuel arrived on 30 June 1920, he found the Military Authorities nervous 'and had made the most formidable preparations against any possible eventuality'. (14)

Samuel's Two-pronged Policy

Prior to his arrival Samuel had decided to adopt a two-pronged policy devised to bring about Palestinian Arab acquiescence to Britain's JNH policy in Palestine. On the one hand he intended to bring home to the Arabs that the gradual establishment of the national home for the Jews in Palestine was a chose jugee as far as HM Government were concerned.(15) On the other hand Samuel intended to win over the moderate Palestinians, i.e. vested interests, by a display of personal friendliness, political liberalism and impartiality within the framework of the Balfour Declaration.

Soon after his arrival, Samuel summoned the notables of Jerusalem and the neighbouring districts to a meeting on 7 July and those of Haifa on the following day. The Palestinian national movement, which had earlier declared that the Palestinians cannot recognise

Herbert Samuel whom they regarded as a Zionist leader,(16) called for a oycott: for a few days, and in certain districts some of the leading men were wavering as to the course they would pursue, in the end with exceedingly few exceptions they all attended. (17)

The failure of the boycott exposed the timidity of the political otability in Palestine. At both of these assemblies, Samuel read a message from the King to the people of Palestine and delivered speeches promising freedom and equality for all religions, good administration and economic development, and declared an amnesty for all who were in prison on account of the Easter disturbances in Jerusalem. Furthermore, Samuel disclosed his plans for a 'first stage in the development of self-governing institutions'.

The 'Advisory Council' was a step calculated to permeate a feeling of participation in the government, and a channel of peaceful expression of feelings that would help avert sudden and violent political explosions. In his report to the Foreign Secretary, Samuel expressed his satisfaction at the favourable effect of his pronouncements throughout the country : '. ..the extremists will no doubt continue their criticisms'. (18)

In reply to Samuel's seemingly moderate announcements, al-Karmal pointed out the basic irreconcilability of the two injunctions of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate : We do not understand how the making of a national home for strangers in our country can be without prejudice to our religious and civil rights. We strongly protest against separating Palestine from its mother, Syria, and making it a national home for Jews and we appeal to the British Government and to the liberal British Nation for Justice. (19)

The Advisory Council foreshadowed in Samuel's inaugural address had its first meeting on 6 October 1920. It consisted of twenty members, with Samuel as Chairman, of whom half were British officials and half nominated Palestinians, seven Palestinian Arabs (four Muslims and three Christians) and three Jews. (20) The Arab members were pro-British notables with entrenched vested interests. Deedes described the first meeting of the Advisory Council as a great success in spite of the criticisms voiced by the non-official members. Furthermore, Deedes reported the presence of 'a feeling amongst a section (notably Moslem) of the population that members of the Council should be elected and not nominated'.(21)

Three weeks later the optimistic outlook of the Administration gave way to a more solemn mood. Deedes explained that the reasons for this change included a new initiative by the 'so-called Intelligentsia': 'In the East this class is almost impossible to compete with', and 'the existence of such movements, as Arab Nationalism, Pan Islamism etc. ,'(22) and the necessity of dealing with certain practical questions arising out of the Zionist programme.

The Third Palestine Arab Congress

Another factor was the prospect of a Third Palestine Conference. The fall of the Arab regime' in Damascus in July 1920 was a severe blow to the Palestinian Arab national movement that had repercussions on the orientation and outlook of that movement. The sense of identity was irreparably damaged, and an important source of backing was

suddenly cut. The Palestinians were left alone in an arena where the balance of power was hopelessly tipped in favour of their determined enemies. The proposed Conference was charged with the arduous task of devising a strategy for the new situation.

The Third Palestine Arab Congress was held in Haifa on 13 December 1920, and was attended by representatives of the Muslim-Christian Associations and Societies from almost every part of Palestine, under the presidency of Musa Kazem Husseini. In the resolutions of the Congress the participants affirmed that Palestine was included in the Arab Kingdom, which Britain promised to recognise in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. They declared their dissatisfaction with 'the present form of government in that it does not satisfy their wishes and fails to safeguard their interests'. The manifesto of the Congress pointed out, in a somewhat circumspect manner, that the Government was illegal since it exercised 'the power of legislation without a representative Council and before the final decision of the League of Nations is given'. (23) They objected to the Government's recognition of the Zionist Organisation as an official body, of Hebrew as an official language and of the use of the Zionist flag, and to admitting Zionist immigrants. The Advisory Council was condemned as 'a false attempt to show that there exists in Palestine a council with legislative powers representing the population '. Furthermore, the Congress contended that too many Zionists were appointed to various offices of Government. The manifesto concluded by spelling out the three 'doctrines' or 'National Charter' of the Arab National Movement in Palestine:

(I ) The condemnation of the Zionist policy which embodies the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, based upon the Balfour Declaration.

(II) The non-acceptance of the principle of Jewish immigration. (II) The establishment of a National representative Government.

The Congress elected an Executive Committee of moderate Palestinian notables, headed by Musa Kazem, and entrusted it with the execution of the resolutions until the following Congress was convened.

The Congress, although clearly anti-Zionist, was quite moderate vis-a-vis the British government. The three 'doctrines' did not challenge the Mandate outrightly, but rather concentrated on objecting against the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in its articles. A state of excitement and agitation in Palestine prevailed during December and early January. As a Congress of the Muslim-Christian Societies it was representative of the elements that had assumed the leadership of these Societies from 1918 onwards; namely, town and village propertied notables, (24) merchants and a minority of middle class intellectuals. National unity meant the lowest common denominator in the anti-Zionist camp, and the composition of the Executive Committee was bound to reflect that. The absence of any mention of independence and unity with Syria was a significant omission that can only be explained in the light of the French occupation of Syria.

The demands of the Congress were not spared criticism by the younger and more vigorous elements. An article by Tsa al-'Isa on the Haifa Congress concluded by saying that the demands of the Congress were not radical enough. (25)

Moderate as the resolutions and the leadership of the Haifa Congress were, the government maintained that the delegates were appointed by small groups of people and refused to acknowledge them as being representative of the population. Thereupon, the organisers of the Congress felt compelled to vindicate their representative character and launched a wide-spread successful campaign to demonstrate general endorsement of the resolutions and leadership of the Congress. (26) The agitation which ensued, with public meetings and leaflets, etc., helped stimulate renewed daily interest in politics and concern for the future among the Palestinians, which inevitably resulted in the revival of tension in the country .

In an attempt to allay growing apprehensions, as well as to establish personal relations with the leaders of the opposition, Samuel invited Musa Kazem and five of his political associates to Government House to discuss with him -in a private capacity -'the questions about which their minds were exercised'. Musa Kazem 'mentioned the fears of the community in regard to Mr. Balfour's statement and Jewish immigration. He also raised the question of representative government'. In the course of his reply Samuel made it clear that it was not within his competence to discuss the policy laid down by HM Government and the Balfour Declaration, but rather it was his duty to carry out these policies. However, Samuel pointed out, it was within his competence to give effect to the second part of the Balfour Declaration. The question of the election of municipalities was already receiving his close attention. Furthermore, Samuel declared that he was prepared to recognise any body of 'gentlemen' representing any important section of the community, in the same manner as he had already given recognition to the Jewish National Assembly and under the namely, that no resolutions should be adopted contrary to the conditions of the Mandate. (27) While the Palestinian leaders refrained from accepting Samuel's proposals, they responded favourably to the prospect of a friendly personal relationship with the High Commissioner and the political implications thereof.

A Feeling of Unsettlement

The revival of political agitation in the wake of the Haifa Congress owed much to a prevalent feeling of unsettlement in the area. The victories of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) inspired the belief that Turkey would probably refuse to ratify the Peace Treaty thus bringing the issue of the Mandate under fresh consideration. Then, there was the feeling that an attempt will be made by the Arabs to expel the French from Syria. In mid-January 1921 Deedes reported that even 'responsible' Palestinian Arabs firmly believed 'that there is still a chance of getting the Mandate changed and that many British Statesmen and a portion of the British Public desires that change'. (280 In view of the many imponderables and the ample room for agitation Deedes expressed his apprehensions regarding the immediate political prospects: I do not feel that there is much reason to fear the responsible members of the discontented party; but the words and actions of the irresponsible members are apt to be dangerous in an atmosphere always more or less charged with electricity, especially at this time of the year when we are approaching Easter. (29)

This same feeling persisted after the text of the draft mandate was reported in the local newspapers. (30)

The February Report gave an account of a movement to collect signatures as a protest against the separation of Palestine from the rest of a region to which, it was contended, the country belongs geographically as well as ethnographically and historically. This movement, among other things, reflected, 'a renewed effort on the part of Arab Nationalists in Egypt, in Palestine and in Syria to achieve their ends by cooperation '. The Report also gave accounts of increased interest in the question of Jewish immigration into Galilee brought about by the attempts of the Haifa Congress to gain support for their resolutions.

In the neighbourhood of Beisan some anxiety and apprehension have recently been expressed by the Arab population owing to an unfortunate and unfounded impression having gained ground that the Government intends to further the settlement of Jews in a manner detrimental to the interests of the Arab population. (31)

The ownership of the Jiftlik (Imperial) Beisan lands issue had a direct bearing on the involvement of the fellahin in the political fight against the pro-Zionist policy of the Government. The fears of the fellahin were genuine in view of the complications involved in their rights to ownership and tenancy of the lands under question.

Churchill's Cairo Conference

On assuming responsibility for the Middle East Department, (32) the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, (33) summoned his lieutenants and key British military, political and administrative staff in the area to a Conference in Cairo.

The Conference's main aim was to review the British position and lay plans for future policy in the Middle East in the light of the French occupation of Syria and the unsettled conditions of Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia.

As far as Palestine was concerned the Conference considered that HMG was responsible under the terms of the Mandate for establishing a national home for the Jewish people. In a 'Memorandum drawn up by Middle East Department' presented to the Cairo Conference, it was observed that the Palestine Administration was being conducted 'in strict accordance with the terms of the Mandate, and has been attended by the happiest results'. (34)

The Conference recommended that Trans-Jordan should be constituted an Arab province of Palestine under Prince Abdullah, Faisal's brother, responsible to the High Commissioner. It would not be included in the administrative system of Palestine, and therefore the Zionist clauses of the Mandate would not apply. In return for all this and the promise of financial assistance, Abdullah pledged, after interviews with Churchill in Jerusalem, to respect British international commitments: to the French in Syria and to the Zionists in Palestine. (35)

Soon after Churchill's intention to visit Egypt, and perhaps Palestine, became known, the Executive Committee of the Haifa Congress announced the appointment of a deputation that would proceed to Egypt and lay before Churchill the grievances of the Palestinian

Arabs. Despite the Administration 's advice to await the arrival of Churchill in Jerusalem the deputation, headed by Musa Kazem, left Palestine 12 March and returned two weeks later. Churchill, reluctantly, received the deputation but refused to discus political questions on that occasion but said he would be pleased to see them in Jerusalem on 28 March. During their stay in Egypt the Palestinian leaders were invited by Syrian- Lebanese political figures to banquets and gatherings where speeches in favour of Arab unity were delivered: On the evening of the 19th the Syrian Union Party held a meeting where the possibility of joining forces with the Arab Palestinians was discussed in the interests of the complete independence of Syria. (36)

While in Cairo Musa Kazem saw Dr Ismail Bey Sidki, of the Watani Party, who advised him to form a national party in Palestine to work for complete independence. Musa Kazem's reported reply revealed the basic strategy of the Muslim-Christian Association's leadership at that stage: Musa Kazem said that the intentions of the Palestine Delegation included complete independence, but they desire, if this were not possible, that the real power should be with the English and not with the Jews; they desired also their own parliament. (37)

When Churchill visited Palestine, he found that the Palestinians were eager to convey to him their strong feelings against Zionism wherever he went. Although no official intimation of the hour of the arrival of the special train bringing the Colonial Secretary and the High Commissioner to Gaza had been received, Large and expectant crowds of people assembled and many persons came in from outlying villages.

During the visit cries of Long live the High Commissioner and Mr. Churchill', 'Down with Balfour', and 'we won't have the Jews' were heard. (38)

When the Governor of Haifa prohibited demonstrations on 25 March and issued warnings regarding the risks and penalties attendant upon joining in a demonstration forbidden by the Government, the demonstrators defied his orders and a collision occured with the police, one Christian boy and a Muslim were killed, one Christian injured by a bullet wound, and ten Jews injured by knives or stones and five policemen were slightly injured.

Three days later the Governor of Jaffa refused to grant permission for a peaceful demonstration. As a consequence all Muslim shops were closed in protest. On the same day in Jerusalem, a large but orderly demonstration was held to protest against the Balfour Declaration.

On 28 March, the deputation of the Executive Committee of the Haifa Congress met Churchill at Government House, Jerusalem. A comprehensive memorandum, which Churchill described as a 'very able paper', on Palestinian Arab grievances and demands was presented to the Colonial Secretary .The memorandum accused the British Government of creating the national home idea and of putting life into it and carrying it into execution even before the ratification of the Mandate by the League of Nations. It dealt with the Palestine problem from legal, historical, moral, economic and political

points of view and concluded by putting forth five Palestinian Arab demands calling for the abolition of the JNH, stoppage of immigration and land sales, the establishment of a national Palestinian government, responsible to a parliament, and the non-separation of Palestine from her sister states. (39)

In his reply Churchill informed the Palestinian leaders that it was not in his power to repudiate the Balfour Declaration and to veto Jewish immigration to Palestine, which the JNH policy inevitably involved. The Balfour Declaration was a fait accompli brought about by the War that the Arabs in Palestine could do nothing about but accept. (40)

He assured his visitors that the Government fully intended to stand by the second part of the Balfour Declaration, which in fact imposed a dual obligation on the Government, 'if one promise stands so does the other'. (41)

In the light of -Churchill's offhand treatment of the Palestinian leaders, it was not surprising that the Monthly Political Report for April should have started by stating that 'The visit of the Secretary of State gave satisfaction to the Jews and brought disappointment to the Arabs'. (42)

Captain Brunton of the General Staff Intelligence in Palestine reported that Churchill's visit had added to the anxiety of the Palestinians because the Colonial Secretary 'upheld the Zionist cause and treated the Arab demands like those of a negligible opposition to be put off by a few political phrases and treated like bad children'. (43)

The heavy-handedness of the troops and the killings that took place during the Haifa demonstrations on 28 March increased hostility to the Government and strengthened unity between Christians and Muslims not only in Haifa but in other districts as well. In Beisan demonstrators protested against Zionism and Jewish immigration during Samuel's visit to the town. In Samaria the Governor reported 'increasing influence of anti-Zionist leaders over the peasantry'. (44)

Hajj Amin as Mufti

The report also made reference to an important and controversial issue: In Jerusalem the chief topic of interest has been the election of the New Mufti; opinion has been divided as to who should succeed Kamel Effendi al Husseini, members of whose family (one of the most influential and respected in Palestine) have held this office for several generations. Learned opinion, represented by the Law Courts, has not favoured the popular candidate al Hajj Amin al Husseini, brother of the late Mufti and the elections that were held returned to the latter at the bottom of the poll causing indignation to the Husseini family (to which somewhat clamorous expression has been given) to a very large section of the inhabitants of all the districts. The Government, the Jews and the Mayor of Jerusalem were all suspected of having influenced the election. Technical flaws in the constitution of the electorate have delayed the settlement of this question. (45)

Settled or not, Hajj Amin soon assumed the role of the Mufti, and it was he who invited Samuel to a luncheon on the occasion of the celebration of the carrying of the standard to Nebi Musa on 25 April.

Samuel's acceptance of the invitation implied Government's recognition of Hajj Amin as Mufti, while the latter's friendliness and courtesy to Samuel on that occasion proved that he was willing to come to terms with the Government. It soon became clear that the election was to be disregarded and Hajj Amin allowed becoming Mufti. Thus Samuel avoided alienating the Husseinis in a balancing act in accordance with recognisable traditional imperial policy.

The question of the Muftiship was an important one in view of the fact that the Mufti of Jerusalem was regarded by the Administration as the head of the Muslim community in Palestine. Furthermore, Hajj Amin was elected as Ra'is al-'Ulama' and President of the Supreme Muslim Council, which provided him with a solid power-base through the effective control over the management of religious endowments awqaf and the expenditure of income there from, the appointment and dismissal of all shari 'a (Islamic) Courts and waqf officials, as well as the nomination of qadis (Judges).

The Administration's efforts to conciliate Arab public opinion in Palestine could not possibly do away with the two grounds on which Arab opposition stood, namely, the political and the constitutional grounds. On the political level the Administration was not in a position to nullify the Balfour Declaration and the JNH policy. On the constitutional side the Palestine Administration could do nothing to hasten the final settlement of the Mandate at the Peace Conference, nor could it change its autocratic and bureaucratic character to a representative and popular one. For whereas the purpose of other mandates was preparing the natives for self-government, the Palestine Administration was committed to a policy of 'immobilism' since self-government for the Arab majority in Palestine was inconsistent with the JNH policy.

Jaffa's Revolt

Shortly after the collision between the Haifa demonstrators and the police, an Arab was found dead in the neighborhood of a camp of Jewish immigrants, and the situation became exceedingly explosive.

The expected outburst eventually took place in Jaffa during the first two weeks of May. This was not surprising in view of unemployment and widespread resentment against Zionist immigration and the quality of the immigrants who abounded in the Arab port. (46)

On the evening of 30 April, Communist pamphlets and leaflets in Hebrew, Yiddish and Arabic were distributed calling for a May Day cessation of work, a proletarian rising against the British and the establishment of a Soviet Palestine. (47)

On the morning of 1 May an authorised Zionist socialist (Poale Zion) demonstration clashed with an unauthorised demonstration by some fifty Communists carrying a red

flag in Tel- Aviv, the Jewish quarter of Jaffa. The Communists (Bolsheviks) were eventually forced out of Tel- Aviv into the mixed Muslim and Jewish quarter of Menshiah. When the police attempted to disperse the Bolsheviks, the Muslims became involved and a general disturbance occurred, which soon spread to the other parts of the town. Wild rumours of Jewish attacks enraged the Arabs.

According to Brunton, 'It is stated that the Jews first began by firing on the Arab passers- by' and that the Arabs attacked a house for the reception of Jewish immigrants. On this occasion the Muslims and Christians demonstrated their solidarity and unity in the fight against Zionism. (48)

Of greater significance was .Brunton 's reference to several incidents that occurred on the first day's rioting which caused the Arabs to suspect the impartiality of the troops and the Authorities. The instances cited by Brunton included 'the placing of Jewish guides on the armoured cars'; 'a Jewish civilian being seen and heard ordering British soldiers to fire on the crowd'; and 'the searching of Arabs by Jews in front of British soldiers'. (49) These incidents precipitated what Brunton described as a monster demonstration on 2 May, where Palestinian Arabs demanded the replacement of British troops by Indians and demanded arms to defend themselves against the armed Jews.

Troubles continued on 3 May and killing on both sides occurred, considerable damage being done to Jewish shops. Women played 'a considerable part in urging on the Arabs to attack Jews', (50) while the notables were trying to calm the population and had a very good effect '.(51)

The events that took place in Jaffa during the first three days of May galvanised the villagers in other Palestinian districts into a truculent mood. Samuel reported to Churchill that several Jewish colonies were attacked in various districts: It has been necessary to send detachments of troops, armoured cars, aeroplanes, and police to a number of different places, and to request the naval authorities to send warships to Jaffa and Haifa as a precautionary measure. (52)

The more serious clashes however occurred in the district of Jaffa. On hearing that Arabs were being killed by Jews in Jaffa, the neighbouring peasants and beduins were immediately drawn into the foray.

On the 5th May some 3,000 Arabs (according to reports) had assembled to the north of the Jewish colony of Petah Tkvah (Mulebbis) about 10 miles north of Jaffa, several hundred strong was preparing to attack from the south. (53)

Government forces repulsed the attackers and pursued them with a loss of sixty killed and many wounded. The Haycraft Commission estimated the number of killed during the Jaffa outbreak at 95, of whom 48 were Arab and 47 Jewish, and 219 wounded of whom 75 were Arab and 146 Jewish. (54) These statistics exclude some of the casualties of the 5 May attack.

Brunton informed his superiors that the Zionists were trying to substantiate a theory to the effect that the outbreak of I May 'was premeditated by the Arabs and that it was arranged by a few notables, encouraged by French intrigue'. In his opinion: Nothing could be farther from the truth. I have carefully gone into the case, and there is not a vestige of proof of French or other intrigue. On the contrary, the attitude of the French consul appears to have been all that could have been desired. There is no evidence of premeditation on the part of the Arabs. (55)

In view of his opinion that the Jaffa disturbances were not a simple outbreak of mob violence but rather an expression of a 'deep seated and widely spread popular resentment at the present British policy', Brunton found it inescapable to recommend concessions to the Arabs on Jewish immigration, or failing that increasing the garrison in order to enforce British support for Zionism in Palestine.

The Haycraft Commission were impressed by the level of crude political interest and consciousness in the Palestinian towns and villages like Tulkarem: In a small Moslem centre of this sort the people are more politically minded than a small English country town, and the discussion of politics is their chief, if not their only, intellectual occupation. (56)

The Role of the Notables

In a report to Churchill, Samuel attributed the outbreaks to political and economic considerations aggravated by the increase of Zionist immigration. The Arabs, Samuel added, demanded representative institutions and regarded the Administration as unduly autocratic. (57) Furthermore, the delay in the ratification of the Mandate 'has been an important factor in preventing the quiet settlement of the country. (58)

Samuel conveyed his feeling of gratitude for the leaders of the' Arab Nationalist Movement', i.e. leaders of the Haifa Congress and of the Muslim-Christian Associations, who used their best efforts to calm agitation. ..If the political leaders had set themselves to foster, instead of to check, the present agitation, the whole country could have been thrown into a state of turmoil, and order would have been reestablished only with the greatest difficulty. (59)

Another indication of the role played by the notables was their attitude towards the reactions of the Palestinian populace against the Jewish boycott of Arab traders in May 1921. The notables were bound to be discredited in view of their failure to play the role the majority of Palestinians demanded of them: During the month a boycott of all Jewish goods broke out. The notables are stated to have done their best to stop it but met with much difficulty; such a step being interpreted by the people as having been prompted by the Jews and tended consequently to decrease the prestige of the notables in the eyes of the public. (60)

Samuel proposed to deport Bolsheviks, to suspend Jewish immigration temporarily, (61) to regulate immigration on stricter grounds, and to look into 'the very early establishment

of representative institutions'. (62) Lastly, Samuel informed Churchill that he viewed with favour the impending visit of a Palestinian delegation to Europe and London and thought that efforts should be made to promote an understanding between them and the Zionist organisation. In another report Samuel recommended to Churchill that Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate, which recognised the Zionist Organisation as an advisory body to the Administration, should be watered down or rendered unobjectionable to the Arabs by the insertion of a similar article providing for the parallel recognition of a non-Jewish body. (63)

Who Opposed Democracy?

Unlike Samuel, Churchill was not willing to conciliate the Palestinian leaders by means of political concessions, even after they had demonstrated a cooperative attitude under tense conditions and trying circumstances. He was particularly averse to giving way to Palestinian Arab demands regarding elected representative institutions. (64) When the Zionists got wind of what Samuel was contemplating, they hastened to convey their strong opposition to any form of representative institutions, stressing once more the identity of British and Zionist interests.

Such a body as appears to be contemplated would at the present time in all probability prove to be unfriendly to British policy in general and the Jewish National home in particular. (65)

The events of the spring of 1921 demonstrated that the notables were in need of establishing their leadership in the country .A show of political solidarity on a wide scale was necessary, and the Fourth Palestine Arab Congress was convened in Jerusalem in May 1921, under the traditional chairmanship of Musa Kazem. About a hundred delegates attended and reaffirmed the resolutions passed by the Haifa Congress and nominated a Palestine Arab Delegation to plead the Palestine Arab case in Europe and London. 'Pending the departure of this Delegation and its discussions in London, instructions have been given that all disorderly movements are to be avoided'. (66)

During June 1921, a more peaceful mood in Palestine prevailed. There were two major reasons for this change, although, as Samuel observed, the 'causes of unrest remain '.

(67)

The first reason was Samuel's important speech at an Assembly of notables on the occasion of the King's Birthday, 3 June, when he reinterpreted the meaning of the Balfour Declaration in a way designed to allay the fears of the Palestinian Arabs and promote tranquility in Palestine. Samuel promised the Palestinians that Britain 'would never impose upon them a policy which that people had reason to think was contrary to their religious, their political and their economic interest'. (68)

Samuel's pronouncement had an unfavourable reception in Zionist circles. Its effect on the Palestinian Arabs was more difficult to gauge. The 'extremists' were not appeased, as nothing less than the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration or even the abolition of the

British Mandate would satisfy them. The greater public, though reassured, 'feel very suspicious of the Administration's intention or ability to carry them out'. (69) Samuel admitted that the Palestinians had expected a declaration more far-reaching and more specific in its terms.

The second factor was the impending departure of the Delegation to Europe, and the deliberate cooling-off policy adopted by the political leadership of the Palestine Congress: ...if the leaders of the opposition to Zionism were at any time to set themselves to fan the ambers, they would soon begin to glow, and perhaps burst into flame. Their influence is being exerted, for the time being at least on the side of tranquility. (70)

The Weapon of Passive Resistance

Samuel was aware of the precarious position of the Palestinian political leadership. He pointed out to Churchill that latest events revealed the great interest in public affairs in the minds of the population in general , peasants, beduins and the uneducated, and their discovery of their power to resist and obstruct the Government were an important new factor to consider. Furthermore, the Arabs possessed another weapon against the Government, namely, that of passive resistance. Should the British Government snub the Delegation, Samuel warned that the turbanned class, the Muslim religious leaders, who had hitherto been 'mere spectators', would step in to take the place of the politicians in leading agitation and rebellion against the Government's policy.

The conclusion is that a serious attempt must be made to arrive at an understanding with the opponents to the Zionist policy, even at the cost of considerable sacrifices. The only alternative is a policy of coercion, which is wrong in principle and likely to prove unsuccessful in practice. (71)

An understanding with the Delegation was not only urgent and necessary, Samuel added, but was also possible. Speaking of the members of the Delegation, he reassured the Colonial Secretary, 'I am informed that their present attitude is by no means uncompromising'. (72)

Despite the upholding of Martial Law in the district of Jaffa and the arming of the Jewish Colonies, the resumption of immigration produced some effervescence 'and the boatmen at the Port (of Jaffa) have given much trouble in connection with the landing of Jewish travellers'. (73) Nonetheless, Samuel expected the country to remain quiet so long as the Delegation was in England.

Meantime certain sections are proceeding with the formation of a more moderate party, which, while not concealing its dislike of the Zionist Policy, emphasises rather the need for domestic reform, particularly, in the interests of the population of the villages. (74)

The idea of co-operating with a Government committed to a JNH policy was not altogether new among a section of the political notability. In May 1921, the Mayors of Jerusalem, Tulkarem and Jaffa, the Muftis of Acre and Safad and the Qadi of Jerusalem

received British decorations 'for services rendered in Palestine'. Furthermore, the battle over the Muftiship renewed and intensified old family feuds, particularly between the Nashashibis and the Husseinis. Zionist efforts and money to promote discord and disunity among the Palestinian political leaders constituted a contributing factor to the idea of a 'moderate party'. In a letter to the Zionist Executive, Eder had the following to report; I am still in negotiation with Arabs. There are various moves on. If I had money something might still be done. ..There is just a possibility of being able to send a second delegation in opposition to the first. (75)

Neither a moderate party nor a second delegation was necessary at that stage, from the British point of view. The delegates were showing signs of eagerness to come to an agreement with the Government and hinted that they may even agree to an implicit acceptance of the Balfour Declaration in principle. (76)

The Delegation's moderation, however, did, not represent the political mood of the population. A confidential Government report assessing the political atmosphere in July 1921 spoke at length about waning Government prestige, public insecurity and the explosiveness of the whole situation: There is a consensus of opinion that a rising cannot be postponed much beyond the return of the Delegation from Europe should they come back empty handed. (79)

The report concluded that 'nothing short of a modification of the Jewish policy and the establishment of some form of proportional representation will ease the situation '.

After a short visit to Cairo, the Delegation went to Rome where they were received in audience by the Pope who expressed sympathy with their cause. They then proceeded to London where they found out that Parliament was not in session. Three members of the Delegation returned to Geneva to put the Palestine Arab case before the League of Nations and protest against the Zionists clauses in the draft Mandate.

These delegates also participated in a coordinated general Arab propaganda effort in Geneva. (78) On their return to England they launched a general propaganda campaign and engaged 'the services of an Advertising and Press Agency'. (79)

One day before Churchill received the first memorandum from the Arab Delegation, he raised the Palestine Question before the Cabinet.

The situation in Palestine causes me perplexity and anxiety. The whole country is in ferment. The Zionist policy is profoundly unpopular with all except the Zionists. Both Arabs and Jews are armed and arming, ready to spring at each other's throats. ..In the interests of the Zionist policy, all elective institutions have so far been refused to the Arabs, and they naturally contrast their treatment with that of their fellows in Mesopotamia.

It seems to me that the whole situation should be reviewed by the Cabinet. (80)

In their first memorandum to Churchill the Delegation reiterated the Palestinian national demands (81) and during the second half of August, the Delegation had two lengthy interviews with Churchill and Major Young of the ME Department. Churchill stressed that he was receiving them as an unofficial body and that as long as they insisted that the Balfour Declaration should be repudiated there was nothing to say. The Declaration, he argued, had to be carried out, and the Arabs must accept the fact. But they could see that it was not carried out in a manner to injure the Arabs, and try and find some basis for a friendly arrangement for the next few years. (82)

The Delegation submitted that while they still had confidence in the British Government and their sense of justice, they felt that Palestinian rights were being carried away. They had to come to London to discuss the root of the problem, the Balfour Declaration, with those who could bring about a change of policy. When the Delegation entered into a discussion of ways and means of protecting Arab rights and interests, Churchill made it quite evident that any representative elective assembly or council would have no power over the control of immigration or any other matter that was vital to the implementation of the JNH policy. Thereupon, the Delegation declared that the two parts of the Balfour Declaration were irreconcilable as Zionism was incompatible with Arab rights.

On the following day the same stumbling blocks were encountered, and Churchill pressed on the Delegation to meet Weizmann and other Zionist leaders, to see if they could work out an agreement under the auspices of the Colonial Office. The Delegation was unwilling to accept this particular suggestion, as they did not recognise Weizmann and the Zionist Organisation. Besides, 'The people of the country do not wish us to parley with them. They sent us to the Government'. (83) Churchill insisted that the Delegation should take up his suggestion and convince him that they were making an effort to come to an agreement as a preliminary condition to arranging an interview with the Prime Minister. The Delegation asked that they be given the opportunity to consult with each other before answering Churchill's request.

Before the Delegation could decide on its course of action in London, the High Commissioner summoned twenty-nine members of the 'Moslem and Christian Consultative Committee' to a meeting in Jerusalem in an apparent effort to undermine the position of the Delegation in London. The declared aim of the meeting was to invite the Palestinian Arabs to express their views on the terms of the impending Constitution being prepared by the British Government. The spokesman for those present replied that it was premature to consider a constitution at all since the status of the country had not been settled, that they could not in any case approve a constitution embodying the Balfour Declaration, and that the Delegation then in London was the body to be consulted on these matters. (84)

Apart from informal conversations between Shuckburgh, Head of the ME Department and individual members of the Delegation, there were no formal contacts between the Delegation and the Colonial Office from 1 September to 15 October. In the course of these conversations Shuckburgh found the Delegates agreeable but noncommittal. Although offended by Churchill 's suggestion that they should get into communication

with the Zionist Organisation, Shuckburgh gathered the impression that they would not be unwilling to meet the Zionists under official auspices at the Colonial Office. (85)

On 24 October, the Delegation addressed a letter to Churchill, which they wanted put before the Cabinet. In this letter they reiterated the fears of 93 per cent of the People of Palestine regarding Zionist policies and maintained that: The very serious and growing unrest among the Palestinians arises from their absolute conviction that the present policy of the British Government is directed towards evicting them from their country in order to make it a national state for immigrant Jews. .. The Balfour Declaration was made without (us) being consulted and we cannot accept it as deciding our destinies.

What they suggested, or demanded, among other things, was that: The Declaration should be superseded by an Agreement which would safeguard the rights, interests and liberties of the People of Palestine, and at the same time make provision for reasonable Jewish religious aspirations, but precluding any exclusive political advantages to them, which must necessarily interfere with Arab rights. (86)

Should their suggestions and views be favourably received by the Cabinet, the Delegation was ready to enter into negotiations with HMG regarding the details of the scheme, which would subsequently be submitted to the people of Palestine.

After much hesitations (87) and as a result of discussion with Churchill, the Delegation agreed to attend a meeting in the Colonial Office where the Zionists would be present. In a telegram to Samuel, Churchill claimed that the accepted aim of the meeting was 'to discuss the possibility of making working arrangements, (88) between the Delegation and the Zionists. In contradistinction to that version, Weizmann wrote Deedes that the Arabs 'had come, not to discuss practical details, but to hear a statement of policy as promised '. The meeting was a failure. 'They entrenched themselves behind this position and Mr. Shuckburgh was unable to dislodge them. (89)

As the negotiations dragged on in London, the Palestinians lost hope of obtaining any decisive gain through diplomatic efforts. In December Weizmann passed reports, which he considered accurate, to Shuckburgh on secret Arab political meetings that took place in Palestine during September 1921. These reports revealed a number of facts about the composition, aims and tactics of the anti-Zionist Palestinian Arab national movement at that particular period.

Political and Economic Factors

These reports covered meetings that took place in Hebron, Ramleh, Loubie and Tulkarem where delegates from the neighbouring villages and towns participated. The meetings provided an opportunity for coordination and cooperation between the national leadership in the cities and political activists in the rural areas. The reports indicate that the direct reason for convening the secret meetings of September 1921 was the realisation that the Arab Delegation in London stood no chance of obtaining their demands and that necessary action should be taken in Palestine. As the Arabs were too weak to confront the

British troops in Palestine, there seemed to be 'only one effective method to stop immigration and to destroy the Balfour Declaration, and that is a systematic series of attacks on the Jews in Palestine'. (90 The neighbouring nationalist committees in the towns had convened the respective assemblies attended by 30 to 50 delegates to decide whether it would be possible to prepare in the next three or four months a systematic series of attacks upon the Jewish colonies in their vicinity. These attacks were designed to frighten Jewish immigration, to convince the British that the Arabs were stubborn and meant to stick to their demands and to show the world that the Palestinian demands were just, and: As a result of this the League of Nations will not sign the Mandate'. (91)

These reports revealed the basis of agitation and the grounds for resentment against the Jews. We have seen how the political factor was considered important, but the economic factor, closely connected with the political one, was equally relevant: We must not allow a Mandate over us, as then all the rich Jews would grab everything in their hands, our commerce will be destroyed, we shall not be able to stand competition, they have many banks, and these banks assist only Jews, they are looking for concessions which will ruin US. (92)

In another meeting a similar line of argument stood out, this time with greater emphasis on aspects which explain the tough opposition of educated and semi-educated Arab middle classes to Zionism, who provided a high percentage of the leadership of the militant wing of the anti-Zionist Movement in Palestine: We must get rid of Jewish domination over us. The Jews are occupying important Government posts an over the land, and the Arabs are forced out everywhere. There is a general attempt by the Jewish intelligentsia to seize all the official Government positions. We must not allow this to continue. If the Balfour Declaration will be signed, we shall remain slaves to the Jews forever. (93)

At the meeting at Loubie (near Tiberias) the incompatibility of the Balfour Declaration with Arab political rights was stressed, and the generation gap clearly spelt out as the old Sheikhs, i.e. elderly people, were opposed to the younger generation 's violent tactics. 'These old Sheikhs do not understand that they are playing with out future, but fortunately they do not have much influence.' (94)

Although the fellahin were reported to be rather 'tired of polities', the activists were sure of their participation in attacks on Jewish colonies if they were assured that the Jews were not as well-armed as they say they were.

The participants in those meetings agreed to prepare the population for future attacks, to collect information on the amount of arms the Jews possess, and to propagate among the military officers (British) that they should remain passive during future attacks.

The Zionists endeavoured to counter the activists by a concerted effort to divide the Palestinian ranks by establishing 'Moslem National Societies' and, later, 'National Christian Societies'.

The object of these Societies is stated to be to work with the Government and promote good relations between the different sections of the community. (95)

Zionist efforts in this direction failed to achieve the desired results as all Arabs who were associated with these Societies were considered by the Arab Press and the Palestinians as traitors. (96)

Samuel viewed these Societies with misgivings, as it was public knowledge 'that these Societies have been established largely owing to Jewish influence', (97) and to the influence of Mr. Kalvarisky (a Jewish member of the Advisory Council) in particular.

Sensing a resurgent fighting mood among the Palestinians owing to an accumulation of political and economic frustrations, the High Commissioner resumed his efforts to gain political advantage by conciliating Muslim opinion through relegating Muslim control over Muslim Religious Affairs (Awqaf, Shari'a (courts, etc.). (98)

Towards the end of October the 'Palestine Committee in Egypt', issued a leaflet calling upon the people of Palestine to desist from work, to close their shops and to mourn the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. Although orders were given for the seizure of the leaflet where found, it had obtained a wide circulation in Palestine whereupon strict security measures were taken to prevent disturbances throughout Palestine. Arab notables in Jerusalem and Jaffa undertook, as far as lay in their power, to prevent protestations. In spite of these precautions and undertakings a disturbance took place in Jerusalem on the morning of the Declaration 's anniversary.

When Arab roughs' appeared in the Jaffa road, they were dispersed by the police but soon after gathered for an attack on the Jewish quarter which was averted by the police. Shots were exchanged between the Arab crowd and a crowd of Jews inside the Jewish quarter. Thereafter troops patrolled the city and the Governor, accompanied by the 'principal Moslem notables walked through the streets and restored order'. (99) Five Jews and three Arabs were killed and thirty-six persons were wounded. Although there were no disturbances in other cities, the atmosphere was tense throughout Palestine. On the following day the political notables of Jerusalem publicly disassociated themselves from the 'unseemly and ill-advised' behaviour of irresponsible youths on 2 November. However, these notables found themselves compelled to protest against the nature of the Court set up to deal with the disturbances, and the unduly harsh sentences passed against the Arabs by it, in contrast with the lenient sentences against the Jews.

A show of mild defiance to the Government by the notables was staged at a meeting held in Jerusalem on II November. The Muslim-Christian Society unanimously decided not to obey the Ordinance conferring upon Governors the power to exact a bond of security for good behaviour from those suspected of political or other offences.

These protestations notwithstanding, the political notables appeared in the eyes of the Palestinian public as failing their duty to lead opposition to Zionism and British Zionist policies. In the aftermath of the November disturbances the Government's Intelligence

Service had reported that, A somewhat disquieting feature is a tendency of the populace to act apart from the notables and to disregard their advice' (100)

All Classes Suffer

The events of November stimulated Samuel and his assistants to bring about the settlement of the Beisan Land Question and that of the Awqaf and Muslim Religious Affairs in order to create a good impression in the country. This favourable impression was short-lived owing to the seizure of 300 revolvers and a quantity of ammunition at Haifa consigned to Isaac Rosenberg, which revealed Zionist efforts to smuggle arms on a wide-scale. This event was the cause of considerable excitement and agitation in the press and elsewhere. Further attempts, albeit on a smaller scale, to procure arms and ammunition were resumed in the following month. The continued presence of unemployed immigrants in Jaffa and Haifa was considered by the Arabs as proof that the Administration did not intend to carry out the undertaking given on 3 June 1921, that only such immigrants for whom work can be found or who can support themselves should be allowed to enter the country.' It is reported that the formation of a society to be known as the "Palestine youths Society" has been mooted. The promoters are stated to be extremely Pan Arab'. (101)

Jewish immigration and British policies were augmenting Arab distress and anxiety in an economic as well as a political sense. A report by the Governor of Haifa, G.S. Symes, on the reasons for discontent and disaffection amongst the Arab population of his district was circulated to the Cabinet by Churchill. Symes rightly noted that economic conditions have a powerful influence on politics and that the former were most unsatisfactory in his district. The villagers were responsive to incitements and anti-Government agitation from the towns and the mass of the 'non-Jewish' population was thoroughly disgruntled:

At Acre and Shefa Amr business is at a standstill. At Haifa nearly all trades, which are profitable to the Arabs, show a decline. ..The Customs barrier with Syria is evidently killing transit trade. ..the non-Jewish shopkeeper is being 'frozen out' of the retail business. Even porters and other casual labour are beginning to be affected by the preference shown by Jewish firms and employers towards immigrant labour. ..all classes of townspeople suffer from the high cost of living. ..Higher up in the social scale the merchants and the effendi class are in a state of mind bordering on despair; they find it increasingly difficult to live by the proceeds of trade or other employment, ... many of them are faced with the alternatives of bankruptcy or emigration. The case of the large landed proprietor is little better; he is heavily in debt, and can obtain no more credit; the price of cereals is low; foreign markets, for one reason or another, are practically closed to him, he is even finding it difficult to dispose at a fair price of lands he may have to sell. To the Arab dweller in a town, his disabilities and distress appear to be the direct consequence of the present British policy and its coronary the Jewish immigration. The Bedouin, of course, will have either to become fellahin or quit the country as it becomes settled and populated. (102)

The only hope for the Administration, in Symes's opinion, was to show practical concern for the welfare of the fellahin, which may enable the Administration to prevent their 'total

alienation' and thus secure the fulfillment of British policy in Palestine. British policy, Symes admitted was 'anathema to the large majority -including